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CASENOTE
Sex, Lies, and Polygraph Machines:
The Portrait of Mr. Cassamassima'
Scientific analyses to determine the truthfulness of a person's
statements have always been attractive to those of us involved in the
criminal justice system. From the time of dunking, hot-iron-on-the-
tongue, and other such scientific truth-revealing tests, to the nervous-
ness and sweat calculators of modern-day usage, we seek to objec-
tively determine the truth. Nothing like that works yet. Of course,
when such an instrument or method is found then it won't be used to
aid the jury, it can supplant it. Why have a verdict (Latin for speak
the truth, loosely translated) when a machine is better?
... Lest some think this farfetched, and admittedly it is, I only
respond that only a few years ago, when I was younger in the system,
it was deemed almost laughable to think that lie-detectors would find
any real place in a justice system.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 948.03(5)(b)(1), Florida Statutes, requires a judge, when
sentencing a sex offender to probation or community control,3 to order
the offender to undergo periodic polygraph examinations "to obtain
information necessary for risk management and treatment and to reduce
the sex offender's denial mechanisms."4 The goal is laudable: to use the
probation process to rehabilitate the sex offender while monitoring him
to ensure that he is not reoffending. The by-product is austere: to force a
defendant to choose between liberty and his right to maintain his inno-
1. Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (en banc). Readers
unfamiliar with the Florida courts should understand that, for constitutional and practical reasons
beyond the scope of this Casenote, the Florida Supreme Court spends most of its time reviewing
death penalty cases, leaving the appellate courts to handle most other questions and interfering
with them only when the appellate districts conflict on an issue or an issue of great public
importance arises. Hence, the Florida Supreme Court is unlikely to address this issue, and this en
banc decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeals has, for all intents and purposes, the same
weight as would a decision of the Florida Supreme Court.
2. Id. at 913-14 (Dauksch, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
3. As the differences between community control and probation do not affect the
forthcoming analysis, this Casenote uses the two terms interchangeably.
4. FLA. STAT. § 943.03(5)(b)(1) (2001).
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cence. As sex offender justice is not perfect, 5 programs that require
admissions of guilt pose special problems from both a constitutional and
policy perspective. Such programs have become common, attracting the
attention of several commentators. 6
The definitive Florida case resolving the constitutional validity of
probation conditioned on polygraph examinations is Cassamassima v.
State,7 where the Fifth District Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
declared that the condition in that case was valid but that the results may
not be offered in evidence to prove a violation of probation conditions.
Part II.A of this Casenote traces the history of sex offender proba-
tion conditioned on polygraph examinations from its beginnings as an
Illinois judge's pet project to its present, codified form in section
948.03(5)(b)(1), Florida Statutes.8 Parts II.B and II.C explain the stat-
ute's wording and speculates on the legislative thought process that led
to a statute commanding trial courts to give sex offender probationers an
order similar to that given in Cassamassima.
Part III of this Casenote explains that the statute, as applied in prac-
tice, conditions sex offender probation on polygraph examinations far
more intrusive than those considered by Cassamassima. It also argues
that Cassamassima did not address new conditions that the statute
placed on sex offender probation after Cassamassima and that courts
faced with these new questions must rely on relevant caselaw other than
on Cassamassima.
This leads to Part iV, which looks at both pre- and post-Cassamas-
sima sex offender probation polygraph conditions and analyzes them
under the nondelegation doctrine, the self-incrimination clause of the
state and federal constitutions, the separation of powers doctrine, and the
5. See, e.g., EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996) (examining twenty-eight cases, the majority of which were
sexual assault convictions, where a jury convicted a defendant, and DNA evidence later proved
that the defendant could not have committed the crime for which he was convicted); Sara Rimer,
DNA Testing in Rape Cases Frees Prisoner After 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at A12.
6. See generally Jessica Wilan Berg, Note, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Silence: Taking a
Stand on Fifth Amendment Implications for Court Ordered Therapy Programs, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 700 (1994); Jonathan Kaden, Comment, Therapy for Convicted Sex Offenders: Pursuing
Rehabilitation Without Incrimination, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347 (1998); William A.
Nelson, The New Inquisition: State Compulsion of Therapeutic Confessions, 20 VT. L. REV. 951
(1996); Brendan J. Shevlin, "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea": A Look at the Fifth
Amendment Implications of Probation Programs for Sex Offenders Requiring Mandatory
Admissions of Guilt, 88 Ky. L.J. 485 (1999-2000); Jamie Tanabe, Comment, Right Against Self-
Incrimination v. Public Safety: Does Hawaii's Sex Offender Treatment Program Violate the Fifth
Amendment?, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 825 (2001).
7. 657 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (en banc).
8. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(1) (2001).
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right to privacy. Specifically, Part IV.B questions the therapeutic ratio-
nale for eliciting incriminating testimony from a probationer during a
polygraph examination and propounds whether alternative therapies
would achieve the desired result without annoying the Constitution. Part
V concludes that the Cassamassima court correctly decided the issue
before it but that the statute purporting to codify Cassamassima
expanded the holding to a realm outside the parameters of Cassamas-
sima and existing constitutional caselaw.
Underlying the entire Casenote is the proposition that the Florida
Legislature should consider revisiting the statute to bring it in line with
constitutional command and to fulfill its own intent to the extent that the
present statute's effect differs from it.
II. SECTION 948.03(5)(b)(1): WHERE IT CAME FROM
AND WHAT IT DOES
A. Where it Came from
The one flaw in the theory is that it presupposes the existence of
the person whose existence is the subject of the dispute. If we grant
that there was in Shakespeare's company a young actor of the name
of Willie Hughes, it is not difficult to make him the object of the
Sonnets.9
1. THE HONORABLE CLARENCE E. PARTEE
Ordering defendants to undergo polygraph examinations was the
brainchild of Judge Clarence E. Partee of Illinois, who began the prac-
tice in 1966. i After working as a public defender, Judge Partee became
distraught with the frequency with which probation was violated," and
he undertook to question his clients about their inabilities to submit to
probation without reoffending. From their answers he concluded that
criminals generally have committed many offenses and: (1) intend to be
more careful about getting caught but do not intend to stop committing
offenses; (2) are coerced into committing future offenses by others who
know of past offenses and blackmail them into committing more, i.e.,
"victims of their own concealment"; or (3) see themselves as criminals
but do not understand why they commit offenses and do not believe they
can stop. ' 2 Judge Partee remembered this when he later became a judge.
9. OSCAR WILDE, PORTRAIT OF MR. W.H. 53-54 (Penguin Books 1995) (1901).
10. Stanley Abrams & Ernest Ogard, Polygraph Surveillance of Probationers, 15 POLYGRAPH
174, 175 (1986).
11. Clarence E. Partee, Probation and the Polygraph, in LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
POLYGRAPH 31, 32 (Norman Ansley ed., 1975).
12. Id. at 33.
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In deciding whether to grant or deny probation, Judge Partee apparently
believed it necessary to "probe deep into the very core of the individual,
to determine his true identity, to determine his true self" 3 so that "the
individual before the [c]ourt sees himself as he is and as we see him, and
not as he would wish us to see him."' 4 Full disclosure of all wrongdoing
in probation applicants' lives was necessary to help them "separate their
past[s] from the future[s] they hope to have."' 15
At a probation hearing's conclusion, Judge Partee began the prac-
tice of calling the defendant to the witness stand and asking him if he
had "committed any other offenses other than the one for which you
now stand convicted before this court."' 6  Before the defendant
answered, Judge Partee would advise him that he had a constitutional
right not to answer but that the court needed to know the answer to make
a sound decision about probation, that the defendant had no right to pro-
bation, and that if the defendant would not answer, the court would not
grant probation in ignorance of the answer.' 7 Few refused to answer,
and the rest answered "no."' 8 To a defendant that answered, Judge Par-
tee would explain that, to be satisfied with the truth of the answer, he
would require the defendant to take a polygraph examination, again with
the proviso that the defendant need not agree but that probation would
not be granted unless he did. 19 Only two declined to take the polygraph,
both of whom were denied probation, and each of the rest, in Judge
Partee's words, "had committed from one to thirteen offenses for which
they had not been apprehended; and in many cases, even the victims did
not know that they had been victimized."" ° After receiving the report
from the polygraph examiner, Judge Partee would require the defendant
to "state his offenses one by one."'" Judge Partee writes:
His pride at being able to outsmart the law is now deflated com-
pletely. His cloak of secrecy has been stripped away, and his past,
and his true self exposed so that the judge, his friends, relatives, the
officers, and he also can see him as he really is, and not as he would
like others to continue to see him. A liar before the court. A con-
13. Id.
14. Id. at 31.
15. Id. at 36.
16. Id. at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 31, 33-34.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 34-35.
20. Id. at 35. Judge Partee was also of the opinion that these probation hearings solved
almost all of the unsolved crimes in his county. Id. Although Judge Partee does not disclose in
his essay whether or not the polygraph examiner conducted the examinations while utilizing a list
of unsolved crimes, appellate opinions disclosed that such was the practice of judges copying
Partee's approach. See, e.g., People v. Ackerman, 269 N.E.2d 737, 738 (Il. App. 1971).
21. See Partee, supra note 1I, at 35.
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victed criminal, but now with a past exposed, showing just how
extensive and expensive his criminal activities have been.
For perhaps the first time in his life, the applicant can feel the
power of the law, and what it is, and what it can do. For the first time
he cannot brag inwardly to himself that he got by with this and that.
There is nothing in his past that he can hang on to with his pride and
ego, nor be a leader among his associates and friends. He has been
whipped and brought down to size for a true analysis.
22
For instance, one defendant confessed during a polygraph examina-
tion to "about five previous 'criminal' acts ranging from taking aban-
doned furniture to robbing while armed with a starter pistol."'2 3 Based
on the past crimes exposed during the polygraph examination, Judge
Partee then would decide whether or not to grant probation. Although
Judge Partee was quite impressed with his own ingenuity, the appellate
courts were not.2 4
Judge Partee eventually ended this practice, instead requiring
annual polygraph examinations coupled with a waiver of Fifth Amend-
ment rights as a condition of probation.2 5 In his essay, Probation and
the Polygraph, Judge Partee did not attribute this expansion to People v.
McVet,26 which forbade trial courts from using Judge Partee's sentenc-
ing procedure, but gave the following explanation instead:
There may be a very friendly dog in the yard, wagging his tail
when his master shows up or calls, but when the sun goes down if
allowed to roam at night, he may become a part of a pack and start
killing sheep. The dog lives a dual life, no more and no less than the
majority of the people asking probation. However, upon disclosure
of the true character of the dog, the owner will voluntarily dispose of
him. The dog may be cured of his bad habits, but it involves a lot of
time and may prove costly-other sheep may get killed. And then if
the owner thinks that he has all of the faults of the dog corrected, he
will never feel certain or secure in allowing his dog his previous
freedom.
In this century we cannot handle the cases involving criminals as
easily as will the farmer with the sheep-killing dog .... The offend-
ers appear to be good people in the daytime, but at night when the
odds favor them from being caught or identified, they ply their trade.
The fox prowls at night not because he can't see in the daytime, but
22. Id.
23. People v. McVet, 287 N.E.2d 479, 484 (11. App. 1972).
24. See, e.g., McVet, 287 N.E.2d at 484 ("It was error for the court to request defendant to
submit himself to the test and impermissible for the court to rely upon the polygraph evidence in
reaching its decision in sentencing.").
25. See generally Abrams & Ogard, supra note 10.
26. 287 N.E.2d 479 (I11. App. 1972).
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because it is much safer at night. Rehabilitation, except in rare cases,
is attempted for nearly all offenders, if not by the courts through pro-
bation, then by the parole systems ...
When attempting rehabilitation through probation, our problem
is to eliminate the Dr. Jeckle and Mr. Hyde characterization of the
individual, destroy or suppress the animal instincts, and nourish the
qualities which differentiates man from animal. The sheep-killing
dog may possibly be disciplined and rehabilitated, but the farmer will
always be wondering what his dog is doing when out of sight. If
granted probation, what will these people be doing when out of sight?
Only they might know.2 7
With this in mind, Judge Partee undertook to condition probation
on submission to polygraph examinations to ensure compliance with
probation conditions 28 so that refusal to take the polygraph was, in itself,
a violation of probation conditions.29 If the polygraph examiner opined
that the probationer was not being truthful, Judge Partee would require
additional examinations, reasoning that "[s]omewhere along the line, I
think we will arrive at the truth. ' 30
Partee clearly believed that he had pioneered a technique that, one
day, would change the relationship between the courts and the accused.
In conclusion, he writes:
Whenever the examiner tells me of tough nuts that are now whipped
pups, that bawl and cry like a baby in their admissions to him, I think
we are dealing with people who can be rehabilitated, whose con-
sciences, though calloused, can be regenerated. It is my belief from
observing all to whom I have granted probation and those to whom it
has been denied, where this proceeding has been used, each of these
applicants has experienced a type of discipline equal to a thousand
hickory limbs [that] they never received, and as clear an understand-
ing of themselves as is intended by the hundreds of pieces of advice
and guidance directed to them but which have gone unheard.
Imagination and work has put man on the moon. No animal has
yet made it. Imagination and work can yet redeem man from his
animal instincts.3 '
Other judges followed Judge Partee's lead. In 1969, Judge John C.
Tuttle of Washington began a program that instituted probation condi-
tions resembling those of the Cassamassima case, discussed in Part
III.A, infra. Tuttle required probationers to submit to periodic poly-
graph examinations to ensure compliance with their terms of proba-
27. See Partee, supra note 11, at 36-37.
28. Id. at 38.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 39.
31. Id.
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tion.32 Apparently, another judge learned that by threatening polygraph
examinations, even without intent to make good on the threat, defend-
ants would confess past crimes copiously.33 Neither seems to have
attracted the appellate courts' attention.
2. ABRAMS AND OGARD
Post-Apollo, pre-Challenger America embraced the optimistic ideal
that technology would improve the conditions of human existence: men
would walk on mars; we all would own flying cars by the year 2000; and
polygraph machines would rid the streets of criminals.34 Early advo-
cates of integrating polygraph technology into the criminal justice sys-
tem seemed to echo this sentiment. A typical journal article, Judge
Partee's included, could be reduced to a four-part syllogism: (1) the jus-
tice system is unable to deal with society's large number of criminals;
(2) society has a large number of criminals because the justice system is
impotent; (3) the polygraph machine detects criminal activity more
accurately than the justice system can; so (4) a system should be devel-
oped whereby the justice system orders criminals to be monitored by
polygraph examinations.
For instance, The Artificial Conscience,35 a delightful article replete
with Freudian nomenclature, advocated a therapeutic technique labeled
the "new approach."36 The idea was that polygraph examiners trained in
psychology would be able to
mitigate some of the defects in ego and superego functioning of the
sociopat[h] and hopefully eventually allow him to develop whole-
some behavior habits and identifications with society through intro-
jection of its values, as represented by the symbolic good parent,
embodied in the polygrapher/therapist who serves both to support
positive behaviors and restrain negative ones.37
Perhaps as a reaction to the courts' animosity toward the new
approach, its advocates began to narrow its scope to less sympathetic
groups. A 1971 article by a police chief speculated that the polygraph
examination might be useful in achieving society's lofty goal of elimi-
nating homosexuality,38 and this article very well may be the first writ-
32. Abrams & Ogard, supra note 10, at 175.
33. Id.
34. Perceptions may vary, but this is what I remember being told.
35. K. Michael Schmidt et al., The "Artificial Conscience": A New Approach to the
Rehabilitation of Selected Criminal Offenders by the Integration of the Polygraph into the
Forensic Behavioral Sciences, 23 CORRECTIVE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 93 (1973).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 99-100.
38. W. Cleon Skousen, The Homosexual-Can He Be Cured?, LAW & ORDER, Dec. 1971, at
12. The illustration accompanying the article, reproduced on the next page, speaks volumes about
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ten work to speculate about the polygraph's potential to influence sexual
behavior. Nevertheless, these authors lamented the lack of statistical
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research, and champion their continued use.
proof and wailed at the
courts' unwillingness to
accept their conclusions.
This changed in 1986.
In 1986, Stanley Ab-
rams and Ernest Ogard,
the former a polygraph
operator and the other the
head of the criminal jus-
tice department at Oregon
State College, published
the seminal work Poly-
graph Surveillance of
Probationers,39 which set
out to chronicle the his-




The study contrasted the
recidivism rates (determined by whether or not probation was revoked)
of two experimental groups receiving polygraph examinations as a con-
dition of probation with a control group composed of probationers who
received probation without polygraph examinations.4" The first experi-
mental group had seventeen members: four burglars, five sex offenders,
and eight substance abusers.4 The second experimental group had eigh-
teen members: eleven burglars, two sex offenders, and five substance
abusers. 42 The recidivism rates of these two groups were compared with
a control group made up of 243 members placed on probation in neigh-
boring counties: eighty-one burglars, seven sex offenders, and 155 alco-
hol abusers. Recidivism rates of the experimental groups were
compared with those of the control group to determine: (1) whether the
polygraph can determine with validity whether probationers are reof-
fending; and (2) whether polygraph supervision of probationers serves
the quality of intellectual reasoning contained therein. Id. How something like this came to shape
legislation is beyond the scope of this Casenote.
39. See generally Abrams & Ogard, supra note 10.
40. Id. at 174.
41. Id. at 178.
42. Id. at 179.
43. Id. at 178.
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as a deterrent to reoffending. 4
Despite statistical quandaries, Abrams and Ogard concluded that
both hypotheses were verified.45 To support the first, they asserted that
confessions were obtained from the eight subjects whose polygraph
examinations indicated deception, hence eliminating the possibility of
false positive results.46 Although there were no indications of false neg-
ative results, Abrams and Ogard admitted that such would be impossible
to ascertain.4"
The second hypothesis was more troublesome; statistical signifi-
cance at the .01 level was reached for the first experimental group, but
no statistical significance was reached for the second 8.4  Nevertheless,
by combining the experimental groups, including the substance abusers,
and contrasting the recidivism rates with the combined control groups,
including the alcohol abusers, Abrams and Ogard were able to claim
statistical support at the .01 level.49 Considering the sex offenders
alone, two out of seven had probation revoked in the two experimental
groups while four out of seven had probation revoked in the control
group.50 Abrams and Ogard conceded that this did not reach the level of
statistical significance but nonetheless extolled the polygraph's use for
sex offender probation because "the probation officer was particularly
impressed with the results [and s]tatistics alone do not describe success
",51
The one flaw in the theory is that it presupposes the conclusion
whose validity is the subject of dispute. If we grant that polygraph
examinations reduce recidivism, it is not difficult to make the examina-
tions the reason that some offenders do not recidivate. To the credulous,
Abrams and Ogard proved that polygraph monitoring of probationers
results in a lower recidivism rate than probation without the examina-
tions. To the skeptics, Abrams and Ogard endeavored in a study that
used thirty-five carefully selected subjects and contrasted them with 243
haphazardly selected subjects, failed to reach statistical significance
except by statistical manipulation, and nonetheless arrived at a pre-
44. Id. at 177-78.
45. Abrams and Ogard did not compare the recidivism rates of the substance abuser groups
with the control group because they realized that, due to oversight, all of their experimental group
members were substance abusers rather than alcohol abusers, and all of their control group
members were alcohol abusers rather than substance abusers. Hence, comparison would not have
been appropriate. Id. at 174, 178.




50. Id. at 180.
51. Id. at 181.
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ordained conclusion. Nevertheless, a quasi-scientific publication associ-
ating polygraph monitoring with lower recidivism rates was now in
print,52 and cases where trial courts imposed the condition began to
appear in Florida in the mid-1980s"
3. FLORIDA
Anecdotal data supports polygraph examinations' usefulness in
probation. For instance, the Position Statement of the Florida Associa-
tion for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers cites a 1996 Fort Lauderdale
case where a sex offender on probation murdered two young girls.
54
Later the sex offender explained that he easily circumvented the condi-
tions of his community control.
The time line is too blurry to determine when the Florida courts
first began to implement the polygraph requirement. The order in Cas-
samassima was implemented in 1995, but the Position Statement's
unidentified anecdotal case took place in 1996, and another is known in
1988.56 In any event, a 1997 statute made the condition mandatory. 57
In 1997, the legislature added the condition58 to section 948.03 in
response to a report issued by the National Institute of Justice59 ("NIJ
Report") that surveyed different states' sex offender probation practices
and found that the most effective way to deal with sexual offenders is to
contain them in a "triangle of supervision" involving a treatment pro-
vider, probation/parole officer, and polygraph examiner. 6° The report's
authors name the goals of the polygraph examinations as three-fold: (1)
risk management; (2) treatment; and (3) reducing denial mechanisms. 6'
This is done, the authors maintain, by obtaining the probationer's com-
plete sexual history information and monitoring the probationer's sexual
52, Additional research currently is underway. See CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER
MANAGEMENT, COMPENDIUM OF OJP-SPONSORED PROJECTS RELATING TO SEX OFFENDERS 21-22
(1999).
53. See Nichols v. State, 528 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). It is unclear exactly when
Florida courts began to use polygraph examinations in probation sentences. The folklore is that
Abrams and Ogard's study exploded the popularity of the sentence, but Abrams and Ogard
mention in the study that Florida already was developing a program. Abrams & Ogard, supra
note 10, at 181. The only way to know would be to dig through the unpublished probation orders
of each Florida circuit and search for the innovator, and this author did not do that.
54. FLORIDA ASSOCIATION FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, POSITION STATEMENT
19 (1998), available at http://www.floridaatsa.com.
55. Id.
56. See Nichols, 528 So. 2d at 1282.
57. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b) (2001).
58. Act effective Oct. 1, 1997, ch. 97-308, 1997 Fla. Laws 5515.
59. See KIM ENGLISH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MANAGING ADULT SEX OFFENDERS IN
THE COMMUNITY-A CONTAINMENT APPROACH (1997) [hereinafter NIJ Report].
60. Id. at 4, 7.
61. Id. at 6.
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fantasies and external behaviors.62
The polygraph examination is necessary because sexual histories
are essential to treatment programs, and the well-known failure rate of
polygraphs6 3 is counterbalanced by the observation that sexual histories
reported to polygraph administrators are, on the whole, more accurate
than sex offenders' self-reported histories.64 Additionally, the report
suggested prohibiting pleas or dispositions that reinforce sex offenders'
refusal to admit their crimes, to wit, Alford or no contest pleas, pleas that
change sex offenses to other offenses, deferred judgments, and referrals
to diversion programs in lieu of filing criminal charges.6 Most notably,
the report conceded that prosecution of crimes first disclosed during the
polygraph examinations poses Fifth Amendment problems.66 By con-
trast, the Florida Legislature, possibly believing that Cassamassima
already had addressed the issue, did not concern itself with this at all.67
Instead, the Legislature adopted the report's findings 68 and implemented
the condition, noting only that "[s]ome of the conditions of probation
that are mandated ... may be cost prohibitive for a defendant[,] leaving
either the state to pay for those conditions or somehow waiving those
conditions. 69
62. Id. at 4.
63. See Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 914 n.12 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (Sharp, W., J.,
dissenting) (string-citing an impressive list of authorities that detail the shortcomings of polygraph
testing). For an illuninating anecdote, see Agents Cleared in Probe of 9/11 Suspect's False
Confession, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 26, 2002, at 13A. An aviation radio was found in the hotel
room of Abdallah Higazy, an Egyptian student, and he was detained. Id. Higazy was charged
with lying to a polygraph examiner when he denied ownership of the radio, and the polygraph
examination showed deceptive responses when he was asked whether he was involved in the
September II attacks. Id. He later confessed. Id. Further investigation revealed that the radio
had been left in the room by a pilot who had stayed in the hotel room before Higazy. Id. The
foolishness of relying on the machine for national security reasons has been brought to light
several times in the last few years. Compare NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, POLYGRAPH AND LIE
DETECTION (2002) (examining the effectiveness of polygraph testing as a means of screening
federal employees and concluding that reliance upon them for this purpose is both dangerous and
unsound due to the machine's unreliability) with Tim Johnson, Cuban Spy Passed Polygraph at
Least Once, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 30, 2002, at IA.
64. NIJ Report, supra note 59, at 5.
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id. at 6.
67. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crime & Pun., HB 1027 (1997) Staff Analysis (final June 18,
1997); Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 1930 (1997) Staff Analysis (Apr. 8, 1997).
Neither contain any mention of possible self-incrimination issues.
68. See Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 1930 (1997) Staff Analysis 5-7 (Apr. 8,
1997).
69. Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 1106 (1997) Staff Analysis 17 (Mar. 25 1997).
20031
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. What Happens on Paper: Section 948.03(5)(b)(1)-What it Says
and What it Does Not Say
The 1997 Act amended section 948.03(5)(b), which lists mandatory
conditions of probation or community control for defendants convicted
of certain sex offenses. 70 The final text of the polygraph requirement
reads as follows:
[Judges must impose a]s part of a treatment program, participa-
tion at least annually in polygraph examinations to obtain information
necessary for risk management and treatment and to reduce the sex
offender's denial mechanisms. A polygraph examination must be
conducted by a polygrapher trained specifically in the use of the pol-
ygraph for the monitoring of sex offenders, where available, and shall
be paid by the sex offender. The results of the polygraph examination
shall not be used as evidence in court to prove that a violation of
community supervision has occurred. 7'
This final product reflects a lack of legislative intent regarding the
logistics of implementation. To illustrate: the phrase "for risk manage-
ment and treatment and to reduce the sex offender's denial mechanisms"
was copied directly from the NIJ Report,72 apparently leaving the
polygrapher, treatment provider, and probation officer to decide what
that means.73 The legislature left the frequency of examinations open as
well, requiring them "at least annually" with no upward limit.74 Regard-
ing the cost of the examinations, the legislature simply provided that it
"shall be paid by the sex offender" without providing a mechanism for
"somehow waiving those conditions." 75  Addressing the probationer's
right against self-incrimination, the legislature simply said that the
70. Specifically, the offenses that trigger the sentence are sexual battery, lewd or lascivious
offenses committed upon or in the presence of a person under age sixteen, sexual performance by
a child, and buying or selling of minors. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b) (2001).
71. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(1) (2001).
72. NIJ Report, supra note 59, at 6.
73. The Third Circuit recently addressed the scope of permissible questions that may be asked
of a probationer in United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2003). In Lee, the federal circuit
court rejected a probationer's argument that a polygraph condition was unconstitutionally vague,
explaining that its scope was limited by the district court's expressed purpose: "to assist Probation
in the conduct of its supervision." Id. at 214-15. The court held that this statement limited the
scope of permissible questions to those that relate to the supervision, treatment, and monitoring of
the probationer. Id. Applying the Lee reasoning to section 948.03(5)(b)(1), it seems that the
scope of permissible questions in Florida would be limited to those that relate to obtaining
information necessary for risk management and treatment and reducing the sex offender's denial
mechanisms.
74. See FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(1) (2001).
75. See supra note 69. Although the legislature did not, the Second District addressed this in
1985, holding that probation may not be revoked for noncompliance with a polygraph requirement
unless the state proves that the probationer had the ability to pay for the examinations. Hockman
v. State, 465 So. 2d 619, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
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results of the polygraph "shall not be used as evidence in court to prove
that a violation of community supervision has occurred."76
C. The State Objectives Behind the Statute and the
Legislature's Intent
Cassamassima's effect on the interpretation of the statute shall be
addressed in Part V, infra. Without the reasoning found in Cassamas-
sima, we are left to divine the legislature's intent. Fortunately, this is
not difficult to do. The legislature intended: (1) to reduce the number of
sex offenses committed in Florida; and (2) to rehabilitate convicted sex
offenders; and the legislature believed that adopting the findings and
implementing the recommendations in the NIJ Report would accomplish
these goals. Hence, the statute should be interpreted with these objec-
tives in mind.
III. THE CASSAMASSIMA CASE AND THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF
SECTION 948.03(5)(b)(1)
A. What Happened in Cassamassima
Phillip Cassamassima was convicted of lewd assault on a child."
As a condition of his probation and community control, the trial court
ordered him to obtain polygraph monitoring examinations at least every
six months during which he would be required to answer two questions:
(1) whether he had been alone with a child since his last polygraph
examination; and (2) whether he had sexual contact with a child since
his last polygraph.78 The trial court professed to impose the condition
based on research showing that it deters recidivism and effectively deals
with denial mechanisms.7 9
The trial judge reasoned that this condition was effective because
sex crimes, especially those involving children, are secret crimes, and
detection and monitoring are problematic.80 Additionally, the court
maintained that a "yes" answer to either question or a "no" answer indi-
cating deception would violate Mr. Cassamassima's probation or com-
munity control.81 Most importantly, the court's order predates the
statute's enactment and, therefore, was not based on statutory interpreta-
tion of section 948.03(5)(b)(1).
76. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(1) (2001).
77. Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 907, 907 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (en banc).
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B. What Happens on the Streets: The Practical Application of
Section 948.03(5)(b)(1) 82
Polygraph examinations imposed under the statute are divided into
three categories: monitoring/maintenance examinations, sexual history
examinations, and instant offense examinations.83 During the examina-
tion, monitors are placed on various parts of the subject's body to mea-
sure changes in relative blood pressure, heart rate, breathing patterns,
and electrodermal activity.8 The examiner then asks carefully con-
structed questions while observing the subject's changes in breathing,
blood pressure, heart rate, and galvanic activity as the examinee answers
the questions. The theory is that an examinee will fear detection when
giving a deceptive answer to the examiner, and the examiner will be able
to observe the examinee's psychophysiological responses to fear.85
82. I am deeply indebted to George and Brian Slattery of the Slattery Corporation, Miami,
Florida, a company that conducts professional polygraph examinations including examinations of
sex offenders imposed as conditions of probation, for generously volunteering their time and
expertise to ensure that the information presented in this section is accurate.
83. Interview with Brian Slattery, Slattery Corp., in Miami, Fla. (Jan. 10, 2002) [hereinafter
Brian Slattery Interview].
84. Id. The idea of combining monitors of specific physiological indicators into one machine
that detects lies was dreamed up by a Harvard psychology professor named William Moulton
Marston. Michael Kilian, Study Warns U.S.: Polygraphs Can Lie, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 2002, at 7.
Although it has absolutely nothing to do with the scope of this Casenote (or perhaps everything to
do with it), the author finds it interesting that Marston also invented the comic book character
"Wonder Woman." Id.
85. Mr. Slattery demonstrated the device to me by having me choose a number between three
and seven, attaching me to the machine, and instructing me to answer "no" while he listed the
numbers between one and nine and asked if each was the number I had chosen. I had chosen five,
and Mr. Slattery easily detected this on his first guess despite my puckish attempt to fool the
machine by maintaining what I thought was a mechanical breathing pattern. Mr. Slattery then
explained to me that when he had reached three, my blood pressure rose and heart rate increased,
indicating to him that I anticipated giving a deceptive answer, i.e., my attempt at deceiving the
machine made it easier to detect my deception. When he reached five, the graph corresponding to
the sweat production at my fingertips spiked, and he then knew that I had given a deceptive
answer. This procedure is one of several given to a subject at the outset of the examination. The
subject is then told that if the machine so easily detected his deception regarding a lie to which he
was ambivalent about being discovered, a deception the subject truly wishes to conceal will be
detected even more easily. This impresses upon the futility of attempting to deceive the machine
and increases the likelihood of a detectable physiological response should the subject attempt
further deception. At this time, the administrator would ask the questions to which the treatment
provider and supervising officer desire to know answers and determine whether any of the
responses indicate deception.
To clarify, the examination does not detect lying but detects psychophysiological responses
to the fear of being caught lying. For instance, the detection rate was found to be only slightly
greater than chance for a group of examinees given an examination similar to the one I was given
but unfamiliar with the polygraph. Martin T. Orne, Implications of Laboratory Research for the
Detection of Deception, in LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH, supra note 11, at 94, 95-96.
Yet, for a different group that, before being tested, listened to an audio tape informing them that
the lie detector could be fooled only if they exerted refined emotional control, the detection rate
was far greater than chance. Id. Hence, "it is the deceptive intent rather than the act of lying
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The monitoring/maintenance examination is similar to, if not iden-
tical to, the examination ordered in Cassamassima, to wit, an examina-
tion conducted to ascertain whether the probationer is complying with
the conditions of probation.86 While results that indicate deception are
not admissible in court to prove a violation of probation conditions,87
this test functions to alert the supervising officer and treatment provider
that further investigation is warranted.8 8 In most cases, this examination
is administered to the probationer every six months, although sometimes
as infrequently as every eighteen months, but the supervising officer
may request that the probationer submit to additional examinations if the
results indicate deception.89 The cost to the probationer is about one
hundred fifty dollars for each examination.9"
The sexual history examination is exactly what it sounds like. This
examination is administered soon after sentencing to ensure that the pro-
bationer's treatment provider is aware of the probationer's entire sexual
history,9" which the NIJ Report maintains is essential to developing
effective treatment programs,92 and to detect any unknown offenses in
the probationer's past without having to invade the lives of victims.93
This examination typically is conducted only once, but it is within the
treatment provider's discretion to require additional examinations. 94
The results are shared with the treatment provider and, occasionally, the
supervising officer.95 The sexual history examinations cost the proba-
tioner about three hundred dollars each.9 6
The instant offense examination is administered only to probation-
ers who deny that they committed the crime of which they were con-
victed, and not surprisingly, the goal of the examination is to determine
whether the examinee exhibits deception in making that assertion.97 The
which yields an augmented physiological response." Id. If an examinee does not believe he is
lying, does not believe the examiner really can detect a lie, or does not care if the examiner
catches him in a lie, an examiner would have difficulty detecting it. On the other hand, if an
examinee is telling the truth but nonetheless believes he has something to hide, whether through
hypnosis, false memory syndrome, or psychological disorder, a polygraph examiner would have
no way of distinguishing the deceptive result from that of an examinee who actually is lying.
86. Brian Slattery Interview, supra note 83.
87. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(1) (2001).
88. See NIJ Report, supra note 59, at 6; see also Brian Slattery Interview, supra note 83.
89. Brian Slattery Interview, supra note 83.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See NIJ Report, supra note 59, at 5.
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results are shared with the therapist and supervising officer98 and are
linked to the goal of wearing down the probationer's denial mecha-
nisms.9 9 The frequency of these examinations rests with the treatment
provider's discretion. ° ° Each examination costs the probationer about
three hundred dollars.' 0'
C. Differences between the Polygraph Examinations Ordered by the
Cassammassima Trial Court and the Examinations Ordered
Pursuant to Section 948.03(5)(b)(1).
The two questions that the Cassamassima trial court ordered
Cassamassima to answer correspond roughly to the monitoring/main-
tenance examination described in Part II.B, supra. Thus, section
948.03(5)(b)(1) had the practical effect of requiring two additional types
of polygraph examinations, to wit, the sexual history examination and
the instant offense examination, despite the fact that neither the language
of the statute nor the legislative history reflect that the legislature desired
this precise effect. The inescapable conclusion is that Cassamassima
found only the monitoring/maintenance examination to be valid under
the Constitution but addressed neither the sexual history examination
nor the instant offense examination. Consequently, the Florida courts
must address these examinations anew rather than affirm the polygraph
requirement under Cassamassima.
Additionally, the Cassamassima trial court ordered Cassamassima
to submit to the polygraph examinations "at least once every six months
for the first two years and then once every year thereafter .... 2 The
statute requires them "at least annually,"'0 3 but does not place a limit on
the number of examinations.
98. Id.
99. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(I) (2001). See also NIJ Report, supra note 59, at 7; David B.
Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279, 285
(1993).
100. Brian Slattery Interview, supra note 83.
101. Id.
102. Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 909 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
103. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(1) (2001).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE
POLYGRAPH REQUIREMENT
A. Florida's Non-Delegation Doctrine and the Delegation of the
Courts' Fact-Finding Power
1. HART V. STATE
Cassamassima overturned Hart v. State,1 °4 which struck a poly-
graph condition from a probation order as: (1) unreliable for forensic
use; and (2) an improper delegation of the court's fact-finding power. 10 5
In a nutshell, the brief Hart opinion found it harebrained to "rely upon
some nervousness-calculator to establish whether a crime has been com-
mitted"' 6 and asserted that such a determination "should be made after
an accusation, proof through actual witnesses (not graph-readers) and an
opportunity to cross-examine as to truth, present counter-witnesses, and
otherwise defend."'0 7 The court noted that polygraph results are not
admissible in Florida 10 8 and essentially concluded that the polygraph
requirement should be invalidated as a prophylactic measure.
The Cassamassima dissenters echoed the Hart court's sentiments
with elaboration. Judge Dauksch, who penned the Hart opinion, remi-
nisced about Butler v. State, 0 9 where a state attorney agreed to an
absurd gamble whereby he agreed to nolle prosequi a rape charge if the
defendant cleared a polygraph test, and the defendant agreed to the poly-
graph results' admissibility against him if he failed.' He "passed"; the
prosecutor reneged on his promise not to prosecute; and his conviction
was overturned because of the agreement."' Dauksch expressed a fear
that polygraphs would supplant the jury function and concluded that
they should be banned from the outset, reasoning that "It]here are ways
to determine the truth[,] but the use of torture and elaborate machines
are not among them."' 112 Judge Sharp's dissent elaborated on the unreli-
ability of polygraph results"I3 and concluded that "they are a waste of
time and money certainly for the probationer. '" 4 Judge Thompson's
104. Hart v. State, 633 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
105. Id. at 1189.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1190 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
109. 228 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).
110. Id. at 422.
I11. Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 913 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (Dauksch, J.,
dissenting).
112. See id. at 913 for Judge Dauksch's fantastical description of what society might be like if
machines supplant the jury function.
113. See id. at 914 n.12 (Sharp, W., J., dissenting) (string-citing an impressive list of
authorities that detail the shortcomings of polygraph testing).
114. Id. at 914-15 (Sharp, W., J., dissenting).
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dissent proved most insightful, explaining that neither of the two cases
cited by the majority to support the condition's validity stood for the
proposition advocated" 5 and that both predate Biller v. State,'1 6 where
the Florida Supreme Court held that a condition of probation that limits
the probationer's constitutional rights must be "desirable for purposes of
rehabilitation."1 7 Thompson then concluded, applying the criteria from
Rodriguez v. State, 1 8 that "no nexus exists between the crime commit-
ted and the condition imposed."" 9
2. THE TENUOUS NATURE OF HART
The Hart opinion cited only two cases, Davis v. State120 and Jones
v. State, 2 1 for the proposition that polygraph tests are unreliable 122 and
then, transparently concealing its disdain, invalidated them. Davis held
that, while polygraph results are unreliable, they may be made admissi-
ble by stipulation of the parties. 2 3 Jones held that polygraph results are
inadmissible in court absent a stipulation of the parties. 24 While each
gave lip service to the inaccuracy of polygraphs in dicta, neither actually
supports the proposition that polygraph monitoring impermissibly dele-
gates a court's fact-finding power. Judge Dauksch's opinion in Hart
essentially holds that because polygraph results are inadmissible absent
a stipulation by the parties, they are useless and should be banned as a
prophylactic measure. Judge Dauksch asserted this more nakedly in his
Cassamassima dissent, stating simply that he "would not let the lie
detector camel get its nose in the probation hearing tent." 125
Judge White, the trial court judge in both the Hart and Cassamas-
sima cases, apparently thought that a polygraph test indicating deception
would be admissible to revoke probation. 126 The Hart majority was cor-
115. Id. at 915 (Thompson, J., dissenting). The cases cited were Nichols v. State, 528 So. 2d
1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (striking the condition as overbroad because it required the probationer
to submit to an indefinite number of examinations throughout a thirty-year period "whenever so
directed"), and Hockman v. State, 465 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (requiring the state to prove
that the probationer could afford to pay for the polygraphs before revoking probation but not
addressing the validity of the condition in the absence of an objection to it).
116. 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993).
117. Id. at 734.
118. Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
119. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 916 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
120. 520 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1988).
121. 453 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
122. Hart v. State, 633 So. 2d 1189, 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
123. Davis, 520 So. 2d at 574.
124. Jones, 453 So. 2d at 227.
125. Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 914 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (Dauksch, J.,
dissenting).
126. Id. at 909.
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rect in its assertion that such would not have been admissible to form the
basis for a probation violation, 127 and Cassamassima re-affirmed this. 28
Nevertheless, Hart struck the condition regardless of whether the results
would be offered into evidence. 29
As Judge Griffin, who later penned the Cassamassima opinion,
pointed out in her Hart dissent, polygraph testing for a purpose other
than to offer as evidence of a probation violation would not delegate the
court's fact-finding power impermissibly, yet Hart forbade it anyway. ,30
Because polygraphs may be useful even if not offered in evidence, the
Hart opinion overreached, and Griffin's narrower viewpoint was des-
tined to win out. To drive the last nail into the Hart coffin, the legisla-
ture, in passing section 948.03(5)(b)(1), explicitly stated that the results
would not be admissible to prove that probation had been violated,' 3 1
thereby making Hart wholly inapplicable.
B. The Right Against Self-Incrimination
1. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT CASES
a. Thomas v. United States'32
In Thomas, the criminal defendant was found guilty of robbery but
maintained his innocence during the sentencing hearing. 33 The court
replied:
If you will come clean and make a clean breast of this thing for once
and for all, the Court will take that into account in the length of sen-
tence to be imposed. If you persist, however, in your denial, as you
did a moment ago, that you participated in this robbery, the Court
also must take that into account. Now which will it be? 13 4
The defendant persisted in maintaining his innocence, 31 and the court
sentenced him to the maximum term permitted by law. 136 In vacating
the sentence, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that "[w]hen Thomas received
harsher punishment than the court would have decreed had he waived
his Fifth Amendment rights, he paid a judicially imposed penalty for
127. Cf. Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242, 1247 (Fla. 1983) (holding that a defendant may not
introduce evidence of a polygraph to exonerate himself).
128. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 911.
129. See generally Hart v. State, 633 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
130. Id. at 1190.
131. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(1) (2001).
132. 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966).
133. Id. at 943.
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exercising his constitutionally guaranteed rights."' 3 7 The court noted
that Thomas still had available to him post-conviction remedies, appeal,
petition for certiorari, and a collateral attack on his sentence, not to men-
tion that admitting guilt would create criminal liability for perjury, how-
ever unlikely that might be. 138 Hence, the Thomas court's ultimatum,
forcing Thomas to choose between receiving the maximum sentence or
abandoning the foregoing remedies and confessing to perjury, was
impermissible under the Fifth Amendment. 139
Although Thomas is still good law in the Eleventh Circuit, 140 the
holding is fragile. In essence, the Thomas court held that a court may
not impose a harsher sentence than it would have imposed simply
because the defendant maintains his innocence after conviction. On the
other hand, the Thomas court admitted that the Fifth Amendment would
not have been implicated if the district court already intended to give
Thomas the maximum sentence and simply gave him one last chance to
repent.14' This distinction did not escape the Cassamassima court.'4 2
Stated plainly, Thomas held that a court may not increase the sentence it
would have imposed simply because the defendant refuses to admit
guilt, but if it would have imposed the statutory maximum anyway, it
may choose to decrease that sentence if the defendant repents. This
unconvincing distinction continues to provoke commentators. 43
137. Id. at 946.
138. Id. at 945.
139. Id.
140. Note that Thomas binds Florida courts even though it is a Fifth Circuit, rather than
Eleventh Circuit, decision. The Fifth Circuit split in 1981 to create the new Eleventh Circuit, see
THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 71 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds.,
17th ed. 2000), but decisions of the former Fifth Circuit continue to bind the Eleventh Circuit.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (1Ith Cir. 1981) (en banc).
141. Thomas, 368 F.2d at 945.
142. Judge Harris's concurrence explained that
an accused does not have bargaining power with the judge, but that is not the point.
The defendant's legal right is to not receive a sentence of confinement in excess of
the statutory maximum. If he feels the proffered probation with conditions is more
onerous than the maximum confinement permitted by law, he should reject the
tendered offer of probation. This is not unfair because the predicament leading to
his dilemma is a matter of his own making ....
Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 912 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (Harris, J., Concurring) (quoting
Bentley v. State, 411 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)).
143. See, e.g., Shevlin, supra note 6, at 496 (quoting Scott Michael Solkoff, Judicial Use
Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17
NOVA L. REV. 1441, 1486 (1993) ("The practical result is the same regardless of whether one uses
a negative or positive linguistic spin."), with approval and adding that "[t]he constitutional rights
of defendants should not be evaluated on the basis of such a spurious distinction").
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b. State v. Imlay'" and the End Run Around Thomas
After being accused of fondling a seven-year-old girl at Donald
Imlay's grocery store, Donald Imlay pleaded not guilty, 45 testified at
trial, 146 and was convicted of sexual assault by a Montana jury. 147
Based upon a psychologist's recommendation in the pre-sentencing
investigation, the trial court suspended his sentence and placed Imlay on
probation conditioned upon completion of a therapy program. 148 Imlay
maintained that he had not committed the assault, and he was unable to
find a therapy program that would accept him without such an admis-
sion. 149 Based on this, the trial court held that Imlay had failed to com-
ply with the conditions of probation and sent him to prison.'
50
The Montana Supreme Court, approving the Thomas rationale,
vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing.' 5 ' In so doing, the
Imlay court agreed that it is impermissible under the Fifth Amendment
to require Imlay to forego any post-conviction remedy to have his sen-
tence suspended' 52 and noted that any confession obtained from Imlay
under the circumstances the state wished to impose "would be highly
suspect" anyway.153 Also noteworthy is the tone of the Imlay opinion.
The Imlay court seemed impressed with Imlay's attempt to comply with
the court's order 54 and unimpressed with the evidence against him.' 55
Indeed, it is quite possible that the Montana justices believed Imlay
when he said he was innocent and that this belief influenced their analy-
sis of Imlay's sentence.
144. 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991).
145. Id. at 985.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 980.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 982.
150. Id. at 980.
151. Id. at 985.
152. Id.
153. Id. Cf M. Chaffin & B. Bonner, Don't Shoot, We're Your Children: Have We Gone Too
Far in Our Response to Adolescent Sexual Abusers and Children with Sexual Behavior
Problems?, 3 CHILD MALTREATMENT 314 (1998) (claiming that the authors knew of juveniles in
treatment programs who confessed to crimes they did not commit and fantasies they did not have
because they feared that they would be dismissed from their treatment programs and incarcerated
if they did not do so).
154. Imlay attempted to enroll in a sex offender treatment program on six occasions. Imlay,
813 P.2d at 983.
155. The information was filed against Imlay based on statements the seven-year-old victim
made to her teacher after arriving at school several hours late. Id. at 980. The court noted that
Imlay was a fifty-six-year-old widower who suffered from degenerative joint disease, that he
suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome as a result of the accusation, that he had no criminal
record nor any similar complaints about him in the past, and that he had raised four adult children.
Id. at 980-81.
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Nevertheless, Imlay's victory was short-lived. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in March of 1992,156 but during this
time, the trial court re-sentenced Imlay to the statutory maximum.5 7
The Court then dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted in Novem-
ber, 1992, reasoning that notwithstanding the outcome on the merits,
Imlay would remain in prison for the statutory maximum. 58 The Court
figured that its holding in Minnesota v. Murphy,159 upon which the Cas-
samassima court also relied,' 6 ° mandated this result.' 6 ' Therefore, anal-
ysis of this issue is incomplete without analysis of Murphy.
c. Minnesota v. Murphy'16 2
While the Murphy case did not involve a probationer required to
submit to polygraph examinations, it required him to "be truthful with
the probation officer 'in all matters."" 63  In Murphy, the probationer
confessed a past crime to his therapist, and the therapist told Mr. Mur-
phy's probation officer all about it.'64 The probation officer called Mur-
phy to her office and confronted him with the therapist's statement 65;
Murphy confessed to the crime166; and he was indicted.167 At trial, Mur-
phy moved to suppress the statements made to his probation officer on
the ground that the state had compelled them through the probation con-
ditions, and the trial court denied his motion. 168 In quashing the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's reversal, the United States Supreme Court held
that the order to be truthful on pain of having his probation revoked did
not amount to compulsion.' 69
156. Montp..1 v. Imlay, 503 U.S. 905 (1992).
157. Montana v. Imlay, 506 U.S. 5, 6 (1992) (per curiam). The Court stated that the Montana
Supreme Court affirmed the reinstatement of Imlay's maximum sentence, id. at 5, but this does
not appear in the Pacific Reporter. While the author has no reason to doubt that this did in fact
happen, it is curious that the Montana Supreme Court would remand for re-sentencing and then
affirm the trial court's imposition of the maximum sentence rather than hold that, as a matter of
law, Imlay had not violated the terms of his probation and quash the trial court's order that
probation be revoked. Imlay may have been a victim of procedural oversight by court and
counsel.
158. Id. at 5-6.
159. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
160. Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
161. Imlay, 506 U.S. at 8 (White, J., dissenting).
162. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
163. Id. at 422.
164. Id. at 423.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 424.
167. Id. at 425.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 436-37. The Court reasoned that, even though Murphy was compelled to attend the
meeting and answer the questions truthfully, his situation was no different than that of a witness
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In dictum, the Murphy Court explained that its holding might be
different had the State compelled Murphy's confession by attaching a
penalty to his invocation of the privilege, 7 ' but the Court did not feel
that Minnesota had done so, notwithstanding any subjective belief held
by Murphy himself at the time."7 I The Court went on to explain that a
state validly may compel answers to incriminating questions if a proba-
tioner agreed to do so as a condition of probation, so long as the state
understands that the answers may not be used in a criminal proceed-
ing.' 72 Because a probation revocation hearing is not a criminal pro-
ceeding, the Fifth Amendment does not prevent a state from revoking
probation if a probationer accepts probation on the condition that he dis-
close whether he has violated the terms of probation and refuses to do so
when requested. 7 3 This situation would be analogous to the monitor-
ing/maintenance examination, and the Cassamassima court correctly
noted this fact.' 74
The result is different when a probationer is compelled to give testi-
mony, whether related to his probationary status or not, that might
incriminate him in a matter different from that for which he was con-
victed. As the Murphy Court explained, had Minnesota asserted that
Murphy's probation would be revoked if he asserted his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, it would have created a situation whereby Murphy would
suffer a penalty for exerting his privilege. This would amount to com-
pulsion, and the statement would be inadmissible in a criminal prosecu-
tion. ' The Court further explained that when a state uses such a threat
to induce a witness to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege and the
probationer gives in to the compulsion and waives the privilege, the
Fifth Amendment forbids the state from following through on its
threat. 176
Exactly how Murphy applies to Imlay is less clear. The Montana
Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Thomas rationale forbids the
state from compelling a confession of guilt for the instant offense. Other
courts have reached the opposite conclusion.' 77 The only Florida court
to address the issue agreed with the latter approach. 7 8 In Henderson v.
called at trial and sworn to tell the truth. Id. at 437. Thus, Murphy had no reason to believe that
Minnesota would revoke his probation if he asserted the privilege. Id. at 439.
170. Id. at 435.
171. Id. at 437.
172. Id. at 435 n.7.
173. Id. at 441 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reiterating the majority's holding).
174. Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
175. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435.
176. Id. at 434 (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 79-81 (1977)).
177. See, e.g., Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1969).
178. See Henderson v. State, 543 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
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State, the First District reasoned, simply, that the Fifth Amendment does
not protect a convicted defendant from compulsion, as part of a prison
therapy program, to admit having committed the crime for which he was
convicted because the Fifth Amendment is applicable only before con-
viction, not after.1 79
Because Henderson was brought pro se by a convicted defendant
while incarcerated 8 ° and because the Henderson court did not cite either
Thomas or Murphy, one might speculate without fear of being mistaken
that Mr. Henderson probably did not bring either case to the First Dis-
trict's attention. Nevertheless, the First District covered itself by
explaining that even if the compulsion did violate Henderson's Fifth
Amendment right, Henderson was not compelled to participate in the
program. Moreover, the prison administrators did not punish him for
non-participation but, rather, withheld the benefit of early release.18' All
of this brings us back to the distinction pointed out by Thomas itself, to
wit, that a court may not impose a punishment for invoking the privi-
lege, but may withhold a benefit, thereby vindicating Justice White's
position that Murphy does not resolve the instant offense question and
that the Court should have decided the case under the mootness
doctrine. 182
For several reasons, Henderson should not be viewed as dispositive
of the instant offense examination question in Florida. First, as stated
above, Thomas directly binds the Eleventh Circuit, and a Florida court
addressing the question must contend with it rather than ignore it. Sec-
ond, Henderson is distinguishable from the Imlay conundrum in that
Henderson already was incarcerated and had nothing to lose, but an
Imlay probationer faces the possibility of having his probation revoked.
Furthermore, Florida's requirement that probationers take the
instant offense polygraph examination is distinguishable even from
Imlay in that a Florida probationer is required to pay three hundred dol-
lars to his polygraph administrator every time he fails to admit guilt for
the instant offense.' 83 Indeed, those of us with a particularly grim view
179. Id. at 346.
180. Id. at 344.
181. Id. at 346.
182. See Montana v. Imlay, 506 U.S. 5, 6-8 (White, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari).
183. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Out of curiosity, I asked Brian Slattery what
would happen if a probationer denied having committed the instant offense and the polygraph
examination did not indicate deception. Brian Slattery Interview, supra note 83. He told me that,
while this happens quite often in divorce cases where a spouse makes a false accusation that the
other spouse sexually abused the children and the accused spouse requests a polygraph
examination to exonerate himself, he could not think of a particular instance when this had
happened with a sex offender. Id. Nevertheless, he explained that the response to that situation
would be within the treatment provider's discretion and speculated that the treatment provider
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of human nature might wonder whether a polygraph examiner might be
influenced subconsciously, or for those of us with extremely grim views
of human nature, quite consciously, by the fact that resolving a doubt in
favor of finding deception will be of economic benefit to the polygraph
examiner.' 84 Such an incentive begins to resemble that which was held
unconstitutional in Tumey v. Ohio.185
probably would request additional examinations and might actually believe him if he passed the
examination enough times. Id.
There may be reasons that this rarely happens, but those reasons strike at the heart of the
polygraph's validity as a science. It would seem that if the examination is accurate enough to
confirm a probationer's guilt, it ought to be accurate enough to exonerate a probationer as well.
Expectancy bias must be taken into account. Martin T. Orne, a researcher, explains:
Consider the hypothetical example of an office in which 100 people are employed
and a theft occurs. All employees claim to be innocent and they are tested on the
polygraph. The guiltlessness of each of the 100 individuals is corroborated by the
test. Subsequently one individual is identified from among this group by some
other means and it is established that he, and he alone, is responsible for the theft
and that none of his coworkers have had any knowledge or connection with it.
Would the polygraph expert therefore be justified in claiming that this experience
shows the polygraph is 99 percent accurate?
An assertion such as this is, of course, ludicrous since from the point of view of
an outside observer it represents a failure for the polygraph. When the situation is
seen through the eyes of the polygraph [expert], however, he, in fact, has tested 100
individuals and in each instance has been forced to reach a judgment of deception or
no deception, and this judgment is actually correct for 99 of the 100 individuals....
The only reason why his view is incorrect is that the group contains only one guilty
individual and the polygraph expert presumably knows that the likelihood of
innocence is far greater than the likelihood of guilt.
Orne, supra note 85, at 103-04. A polygraph examiner conducting an instant offense examination
knows that the examinee either has pleaded guilty to the offense or has been found guilty by a
jury. Such knowledge is likely to affect an examiner's professional judgment as to whether the
examinee indicates deception in denying guilt of the instant offense. It is tautological to say
otherwise: that ninety-nine percent of the examinees are guilty; that the examiner determines that
one hundred percent of the examinees are guilty; and that, therefore, it is logical to believe in the
examinations because they are accurate ninety-nine percent of the time. The same could be done
without the machine. Palm readers with the same information could achieve the same level of
accuracy.
184. Out of respect for George and Brian Slattery, the author feels compelled to note that they
are very respected members of their profession, and no one familiar with their reputations would
believe for a minute that they would be influenced by this fact in interpreting polygraph results.
Nevertheless, we all know better than to believe that every member of a given profession will live
up to the professionalism of its most respected members. Roosevelt and Nixon were both
presidents; Rodman and Jordan were both basketball players. My comment refers to human
nature in general, not to Messrs. Slattery.
185. 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (holding that a defendant's due process rights were violated when
the judge (also the mayor), was paid for convictions but not for acquittals and found the defendant
guilty of a liquor code violation). As Tumey traditionally has been applied to judges, the question
of whether Tumey would govern a polygraph examiner with a pecuniary interest in finding
deception in an probationer's examination would be a case of first impression for the courts. This
author's feeling is that Tumey does not govern where the person with the pecuniary interest is not
a judge or person performing a quasi-judicial function, but courts should address the question
within the penumbras of Tumey. Cf Gavagan v. Marshall, 160 Fla. 154, 161, 33 So. 2d 862, 867
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Because the statute does not limit the number of examinations to
which the probationer may be subjected, a treatment provider would be
within the letter of the law if he were to order the probationer to submit
to polygraph examinations daily until he admits guilt or runs out of
money, whichever comes first.'86 If this is not compulsion by economic
sanction within the Murphy court's meaning,"' it would be interesting
to know what is. Third, Henderson analyzed the requirement that Mr.
Henderson admit guilt under the federal Constitution's privilege against
self-incrimination, and although no Florida court has addressed such a
requirement under the Florida Constitution's privilege,' 88 there is con-
siderable evidence that the Florida privilege is broader than the federal
privilege for reasons discussed in Part II.C, infra. None of these obser-
vations convincingly show that Henderson was wrongly decided, but
they give an appellate court faced with the same question a reason to
examine the question in detail rather than dispose of the question under
the authority of Henderson.




As Murphy explained and Cassamassima confirmed, the Fifth
Amendment does not prevent a state from conditioning probation on a
probationer's willingness to disclose whether or not he is complying
with the court-imposed terms of probation. 89 The fact that the proba-
tioner is attached to a polygraph machine when required to make the
(Fla. 1948) ("It is well recognized that when one has a pecuniary interest in a determination of a
matter that he is not as impartial as he would be if he had no such interest.").
186. Under Hockman v. State, 465 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), probation may not be
revoked for failure to submit to the polygraph examinations if the probationer is unable to pay for
them. The Third Circuit addressed this question in United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206 (3d Cir.
2003), where a probationer objected to a polygraph condition apparently leaving to the probation
officer's discretion who would pay for the examinations. Unfortunately, the Lee court did not
elucidate a standard that courts can use to evaluate whether a payment condition amounts to
economic compulsion, instead saying only: "[W]e will assume that the appellant is required to
contribute to the costs based on his ability to pay." Id. at 215. Cf Brown v. Superior Court, No.
D039525, 2002 WL 1587071 (Cal. App. July 19, 2002) (ordering a writ of mandate to the
sentencing court requiring it to make findings as to a probationer's ability to pay before ordering
him to bear the costs of the polygraph examinations).
187. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984). Interestingly, polygraph examiners
often require probationers to sign elaborate release forms as a condition of performing the
polygraph examination. See State v. Ostreicher, No. CR95225614, 2002 WL 450393, at *2-*3
(Conn. Super. Mar. 4, 2002).
188. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
189. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7; Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 911 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1995).
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disclosure does not affect the analysis.19 ° If the probationer refuses to
answer, his probation may be revoked if expressly conditioned on will-
ingness to answer, and even if it was not, a judge may consider his
silence in deciding whether the probationer has violated the terms of
probation.' 9' Any compelled statement he makes regarding compliance
with the conditions of his probation would be admissible in a probation
revocation hearing because a probation revocation hearing is not a crimi-
nal proceeding.' 92 Nevertheless, if a probationer simply lies about hav-
ing violated the terms of his probation and the polygraph examiner picks
this up, the polygraph results themselves would not be admissible at the
probation revocation hearing. 93 This is straightforward.
If the probationer has violated the terms of his probation by com-
mitting a new crime, the probationer may invoke his right against self-
incrimination, and the state must decide whether to compel the disclo-
sure in exchange for granting immunity. 194 If the state does not offer
immunity and the probationer persists in refusing to answer, the state
may not revoke his probation for failure to comply with the disclosure
requirement.' If the state attempts to deceive the probationer into
believing that invoking the privilege would result in revoked probation
and the probationer succumbs, his statements would be inadmissible
under Miranda.'96
b. Sexual History Examinations
Regarding separate offenses that occurred before probation was
issued and for which the probationer still might face prosecution, the
state may not make good on its threat to revoke probation if the proba-
tioner invokes his privilege against compelled self-incrimination.'
Nevertheless, if the probationer "succumbs to the threat" and admits a
190. United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2003).
191. See Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 911 (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7).
192. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 441 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(1) (2001); Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 911.
194. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 911.
195. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 79-81 (1977)).
196. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434-35; see also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 498-99
(1967). The result is that a probationer may be sent to prison for refusing to answer questions
about his compliance with probation conditions, but if he simply lies about his compliance, the
state would have to prove his non-compliance to prove that he was lying, and the polygraph
results would not be admissible for this purpose. The monitoring/maintenance examination, then,
serves only to alert the probation officer that he should pay closer attention to whether the
probationer is complying with the conditions of probation, and the Cassamassima court correctly
held that this is permissible under Murphy.
197. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434; Leflcowitz, 414 U.S. at 79-81. But cf McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S.
24 (2002) (plurality opinion) (holding that a state may compel incriminating disclosures as part of
a Kansas prison treatment program so long as sanctions for nonparticipation are not serious, in
part because the nature of prison involves the loss of some rights). The McKune Court did not
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separate offense, his statements would be inadmissible in a criminal
prosecution. 198 This is straightforward, also, as well as rational. The
probationer already has been apprehended and directed to a treatment
program, so the state's interest in apprehending and rehabilitating the
probationer is nil. If the state's interest for requiring the probationer to
disclose his complete sexual history truly is to aid the treatment provider
in rehabilitating the sex offender and not to gather evidence to use in
separate prosecutions, then the state's interest in detecting and prosecut-
ing separate offenses is outweighed by its interest in preventing the pro-
bationer from re-offending.
c. Instant Offense Examinations
A probationer who enters a plea of guilty effectively waives his
right to be free of compelled self-incrimination. 99 For this reason, the
instant offense examination cannot violate the federal Fifth Amendment
right of a probationer who has pleaded guilty, and this Part is inapplica-
ble. Instead, this Part concerns itself with the hypothetical situation in
which a defendant pleads not guilty, receives a conviction, and is
allowed probation instead of a prison sentence. While it might be
argued that a defendant who pleads not guilty and testifies in his own
defense should be treated differently than a defendant who does not do
so because of the issue of amenability to a future perjury conviction, this
Part assumes that this distinction does not affect the analysis.
Florida currently stands in conflicting precedent over these exami-
nations."° In Montana, the situation appears to be that while a trial
court may not increase the sentence it otherwise would have imposed as
punishment for a defendant's refusal to admit guilt, it may sentence a
defendant to the statutory maximum if a defendant cannot be treated
because he maintains his innocence, however much sense that makes.
This places Montana defendants in the unique position of having more
liberty if the trial court violates their civil rights than they would have if
the trial court upholds them. This result is bizarre, and Justice White
was correct in his assertion that the United States Supreme Court needs
to address this issue. 0 Until then, the Florida courts eventually will
reach the question of whether the disclosures would be admissible in a prosecution for an earlier
crime, only that the state may compel them.
198. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434-35; Garrity, 385 U.S. at 498-99.
199. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
200. Compare Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966), with Henderson v. State,
543 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
201. See Montana v. Imlay, 506 U.S. 5, 6-7 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from dismissal of
certiorari).
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have to analyze these examinations under Thomas and Henderson and
decide which rule to follow. If they decide to follow Thomas, they also
will have to decide whether a trial court may grant and then revoke
probation via the Imlay maneuver.
Analysis of this question necessitates examination of the difference
between the federal privilege and the Florida privilege. The Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in pertinent part that
"[n]o person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. .. ", By contrast, Florida's first Constitution pro-
vided: ". . shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself."2 °3
This wording survived the Secession Constitution of 186120 and the
Reconstruction Constitution of 1865,205 but in 1868, the phrase, "in any
criminal case" was added, and "give evidence against himself' was
changed to "be a witness against himself. '20 6 This change appeared to
have the effect of bringing a once broader Florida privilege in line with
the federal privilege, although it seems to have taken about forty years
before the courts recognized the change. 0 7 The 1868 wording remained
unchanged in the 1885 Constitution,20 8 but the drafters of the 1968 Con-
stitution changed the phrase "in any criminal case" to "in any criminal
matter"2 9 for reasons nobody seems to know.2 ' Although the Florida
202. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
203. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art I, § 10.
204. FLA. CONST. of 1861, art I, § 10.
205. FLA. CONST. of 1865, art I, § 10.
206. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art I, § 8.
207. Compare Dickens v. State, 50 Fla. 17, 38 So. 909 (Fla. 1905) (implying in dictum that
having a person in custody hold up his foot so police could measure his shoe and compare it with
a crime scene footprint would violate the Florida Constitution if not done voluntarily because such
would force him to give evidence against himself), with Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547
(Fla. 1926) (stating in dictum that forcibly removing a prisoner's clothing to view a wound linking
him to a crime does not violate Florida's privilege because it does not compel him to be a witness
against himself).
208. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. 1, § 12.
209. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
210. Neither the legislative history nor the transcript of the Constitutional Revision
Committee's hearings mention the change, and the Committee's chair has no recollection of why
the change was made. See E-mail from Chesterfield Smith, Holland & Knight, LLP, to James M.
Shaw, University of Miami Law Review (Jan. 11, 2002, 17:11:10 EST) (on file with author). The
1968 revision materials stored at the Florida State Archives provide no guidance, either.
Voicemail from Dan Trescott, Archivist, Florida State Archives, to James M. Shaw, University of
Miami Law Review (Jan. 25, 2002). From my own examination of them it appears that the
change first appeared in the 28 November 1966 draft as part of proposed amendment no. 43,
which would have limited public officials' privileges against self-incrimination. When the
amendment was defeated, the language was changed back to the language from article t, section
12, of the 1885 Constitution except that, for some unexplained reason, the change from "case" to
"matter" remained.
Judge Thomas E. Barkdull, who served on the Style and Drafting Committee during the
revision, professed a similar lack of specific recollection. Telephone Interview with the
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Supreme Court has noted that in some instances Florida's privilege
against self-incrimination protects criminal defendants more broadly
than the federal privilege,21' the distinction between cases and matters
has gone unnoticed now for thirty-five years, probably because no one
has managed to find something that is a "criminal matter" without being
a "criminal case. 212
Florida courts should give serious thought to the proposition that, in
requiring the instant offense polygraph examination, the Legislature has
Honorable Thomas E. Barkdull (Jan. 22, 2002). Judge Barkdull remembers both that some
wanted to broaden the circumstances in which the privilege may be invoked and that others
wanted to narrow the privilege so that the privilege could not be invoked when a specific question
did not involve a criminal matter. Id. Apparently, as Judge Barkdull remembers, the change from
"criminal case" to "criminal matter" satisfied both camps that their concerns were met, and it was
not mentioned again. Id. Nevertheless, it seems anomalous that the framers would have intended
to narrow the privilege because, unless Florida manages to secede from the Union again, the state
courts still would have to apply the privilege as interpreted by the federal courts. See U.S. CONST.
art. VI, § 2.
211. For example, use at trial of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence violates article I, section 9 of
the Florida Constitution but not the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State
v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761, 769-70 (Fla. 1998).
212. Cf Ex Parte Senior, 37 Fla. 1, 19 So. 652 (Fla. 1896). The Senior court, applying article
I, section 12 of the 1885 Constitution, declined to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held
in contempt for testifying, in a dispute about an election, where he invoked his privilege against
self-incrimination when asked if he could vote in Florida legally. The court held that Senior, by
voluntarily testifying that he had voted, voluntarily waived his right to be free from compulsion to
testify as to whether he legally could do so. Ex Parte Senior, 37 Fla. at 26, 19 So. at 657. The
court explained:
The provision, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, should be broadly and liberally construed to secure the
protection designed to be accomplished by it, and to this end no technical limitation
should be placed upon the terms employed. The terms "in any criminal case" might
on casual reading be taken to confine the protection against self-accusation to
investigations in criminal cases, but such is not the true meaning.
Ex Parte Senior, 17 Fla. at 17, 19 So. at 654. As far as the author's research indicates, Senior
comes closer than any other Florida case to explaining the difference between the privilege's
application in a criminal case versus a criminal matter. Later in the opinion, the court
distinguished a United States Supreme Court case where a witness was held not to have waived
the privilege because
[t]he matter testified about by Counselman-shipping of grain over railroads-was
not criminal, nor did it contain any elements of criminality. The crime consisted in
paying a less freight than the tariff or open rate, and when asked about this matter
he refused to disclose anything about it. He stopped on the border of the criminating
matter, and the case presented no ground of waiver of privilege as to such matter.
Ex Parte Senior, 17 Fla. at 27, 19 So. at 657 (emphasis added) (distinguishing Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)). Hence, applying the privilege to "cases" means that it is
triggered only when the testimony could lead to prosecution, but applying it to "matters" means
that the privilege is triggered whenever the subject matter itself is criminal. It is possible that the
framers of the 1968 Constitution had Senior in mind when they changed the word "case" to
"matter," but because the langUage in Senior seems incidental to that result rather than calculated
to answer that question, the author has reservations about advocating Senior as dispositive in
either direction.
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found one. It cannot be ignored that, even if Henderson is correct that
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies only to
incriminating statements made before trial because they are "compelled
in any criminal case," compelled statements made after conviction
remain statements "compelled in any criminal matter." Whether this
distinction, coupled with the fact that, unlike the Imlay scenario, Flor-
ida's instant offense examination falls squarely within the Supreme
Court's definition of compulsion by economic sanction, will tip the
scales away from Cassamassima and toward Thomas remains to be
determined by the Florida courts.213
Even if the Florida courts ultimately do decide to follow the Hen-
derson rule and hold that article I, section 9, allows compelled confes-
sions of the instant offense, they should consider adopting
Cassamassima dicta and placing an upper limit on the number of times a
therapist may require the probationer to submit to a polygraph examina-
tion. As explained above, the statute's language does not preclude the
use of the polygraph as a form of economic harassment calculated to
compel a defendant to waive his privilege against self-incrimination, but
surely this was not the legislature's intention. While the Cassamassima
court did not have this issue before it, this probably is what it meant by,
"We hold that the lower court may require this defendant to take a poly-
graph at reasonable intervals .... "214
In fact, the earliest Florida case to strike a polygraph condition
appears to have done so for this very reason. 215 To ensure that the
examinations are not used for this purpose, a Florida court that upholds
the validity of the instant offense examination should limit the number
of examinations that a treatment provider may require should the
treatment provider's discretionary number exceed the limits of
reasonableness.
1. "Stop trying to help me, I'd much rather surrender my rights in
exchange for probation than be sent to prison to protect
them," sayeth the convicted sex offender.
Criminal practitioners know that a defendant who pleads guilty is
asked by the trial judge, "Are you pleading guilty because you are, in
fact, guilty?" to aid her in her discretionary decision to accept the plea
213. Again, it must be emphasized that neither Cassamassima nor any other Florida case ever
has addressed the propriety of the instant offense examination under either the state or federal
constitutions.
214. Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (emphasis added).
215. See Nichols v. State, 528 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (striking the condition
as "overbroad, unnecessarily burdensome or oppressive, or a combination thereof").
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as free and voluntary.2 16 An Imlay defendant, then, is in a position of
grace. He has turned down the State's offer of probation in exchange for
a guilty plea; he has been convicted; and through the grace of the court,
he has been placed in the same position as he would have been had he
accepted the state's initial offer. Why should a constitutional right for-
bid the convicted sex offender from striking any bargain he likes with
the court in order to avoid incarceration? Hence, Thomas comes around
full circle, and the distinction between punishing a defendant and with-
holding a privilege from him, artificial though it is, rears its ugly head
once again.
The quarrel is with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
whereby the government may not withhold a benefit on a basis that
infringes on a constitutionally protected interest.217 The counterargu-
ment is that the doctrine prohibits a defendant from agreeing to a proba-
tion order and interferes with a state's ability to run its probation
system.218
The distinction is one of degree. Let us assume, arguendo, that
Judge Harris was correct in his assertion that a convicted defendant's
only legal right is not to receive a sentence above the statutory maxi-
mum and that the defendant and court ought to be able to strike any
bargain they wish with one another, notwithstanding the imbalance in
bargaining power.2t 9 If Judge Harris were correct, a trial court on a
mission, without offending the Constitution, could make a habit of
reducing defendants' sentences conditioned upon their renunciation of
Catholicism but impose the statutory maximum sentences on all Catho-
lic defendants who refuse to renounce it. Even if the court relied on
empirical evidence unequivocally proving that Catholics are more likely
to re-offend than members of other religious sects, few would have
trouble understanding that this offends the Constitution and that a court
may not exercise its discretion based on such an impermissible criterion.
This is well understood because freedom of religion is a fundamental
right. Nonetheless, the right against compelled self-incrimination is no
less a fundamental right than the free exercise of religion. Judge Har-
ris's position becomes untenable when carried to its logical conclusion.
At the other end of the spectrum, most would see little problem in a
state's choice of reinstating the suspended drivers' licenses of reckless
drivers who submit to driving school and refusing to reinstate the
licenses of the few who refuse to attend. At first blush, it seems that this
216. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. II (b)(2).
217. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
218. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 n.4 (2001).
219. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 912.
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is because driving is a privilege rather than a right. Nevertheless, the
privilege/right distinction notwithstanding, the state may not deny driv-
ers' licenses based on membership in a religious sect, either.22 0 Indeed,
the difference between withholding a benefit and imposing a penalty is
fallacious. If a mother buys six of her seven children an ice cream cone
and explains that the seventh does not get one because she is angry with
him, logicians may be able to explain that while the seventh child was
not rewarded, he was not punished either, but everyone knows that's not
what happened. While it might seem that the distinction is that of a right
conferred to many with few exceptions and a privilege conferred to few
with many exceptions, it seems that a state would offend the Constitu-
tion no more or less by granting probation to Catholics and sentencing
non-Catholics to the statutory maximum.
Although it is neither criminal to be Catholic nor to refuse to attend
driving school, the one seems a flagrant constitutional violation and the
other completely rational, and the right/privilege distinction fails to clar-
ify the differing perceptions of fairness. The actual reason is that one is
reasonably related to the offense and the other is not. The courts have
equilibrated the spectrum by holding that probation conditions must be
"desirable for the purposes of rehabilitation. '221 While it is appealing to
avoid this difficult issue altogether by holding that a convicted defendant
has no right to leniency and may be granted or denied it on whatever
basis the court wishes, courts should not do so. It is not difficult to
imagine the serious miscarriages of justice that carrying this holding to
its logical conclusion would create.
2. "Explain to me one more time why this instant offense
examination is so important that we are playing games
with one of our most sacred freedoms," sayeth the skeptic.
Exactly why it is necessary for a sex offender to admit guilt before
he can be rehabilitated is not clear. Religious doctrine has supported the
assumption for centuries,22 2 and people generally accept it as true.2 23
Nevertheless, proponents of the theory are not forthcoming with empiri-
220. See Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), affd sub noi. by an equally
divided Court, Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (holding that Nebraska may not refuse to
issue a driver's license for failure to consent to a photograph if sincerely held religious beliefs
forbid photography because conditioning a driver's license on the violation of a fundamental
religious precept is impermissible under the First Amendment).
221. Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993).
222. "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and purify us
from all unrighteousness." I John 1:9 (NIV).
223. See Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1969) ("It is almost axiomatic
that the first step toward rehabilitation is the offender's recognition that he was at fault.").
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cal data.224 As one commentator explains:
Even if one accepts the optimistic view that some programs
reduce recidivism, it is impossible for court officers to base referrals
to treatment programs on the available research because evaluation
studies do not distinguish which of the many therapies currently in
use are responsible for any claimed reduction in recidivism. For
example, when a program that appears to reduce recidivism provides
relapse prevention, some individual counseling, and Depo-Provera,
there is no way of knowing which of the three treatment approaches,
or what combination, was responsible for the positive results.2 25
Jonathan Kaden puts forth perhaps the most well-reasoned scrutiny
to date on this seemingly unquestionable assumption by highlighting
effective treatment modalities that function without this prerequisite.226
First among the therapies unearthed in Kaden's Comment is metacon-
frontation, in which the treatment provider empathizes with the sex
offender's denial mechanism with the aim of making the sex offender
comfortable enough to accept responsibility for his actions.227 Next is
the Schlank and Shaw method,228 which integrates metaconfrontation
with elicitation of victim empathy. Last is multisystemic treatment,22 9 in
224. See Peter Finn, Do Sex Offender Treatment Programs Work?, 78 JUDICATURE 250 (1995).
Finn explained:
Few studies have tested whether sex offender treatment reduces recidivism. And all
the evaluations have had one or more serious weaknesses, such as relying
exclusively on official arrest or conviction records to assess recidivism; enrolling
offenders who are least likely to offend again; tracking clients for only a short
period of time after they have completed treatment; or failing to assign offenders
randomly to a treatment group and a control group.
Id. at 251. See also Judith V. Becker & William D. Murphy, What We Know and Do Not Know
About Assessing and Treating Sex Offenders, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 116 (1998). Becker
and Murphy report that
[t]here are, to our knowledge, no reports of controlled studies using polygraphy with
this population in the literature, and the utility of polygraph methodology in this
area is difficult to assess. Regarding this method of assessment, clinicians should
consider the unknown effects of repeated testing, the high possibility of false
positive errors in some cases, and the issue that physiological responses measured
by the polygraph are not specific correlates of lying.
Id. at 123 (citing M.L. Lalumiere & V.L. Quinsey, Polygraph Testing of Child Molesters: Are We
Ready?, 1 VIOLENCE UPDATE 3 (1991)); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT: RESEARCH RESULTS INCONCLUSIVE ABOUT WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM
(1996) (responding to Bill McCollum's, then-Florida congressman and Chairman of the House of
Representatives Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime, request for review of research on
sex offender recidivism and concluding that no method conclusively reduces recidivism).
225. Finn, supra note 224, at 552.
226. See Kaden, supra note 6, at 365-73.
227. Id. at 370-71.
228. Id. at 371-72.
229. Id. at 372-73. Multisystemic therapy, or MST, remains unproven as a modality for adult
sex offender treatment as most every study focuses on its use in rehabilitating adolescent sex
offenders. In MST,
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which the treatment provider attempts to improve the sex offender's role
behavior in social groups without directly requiring acceptance of
responsibility at all. Regarding this last treatment option, Kaden points
out that multisystemic treatment yields a twelve-and-a-half percent
recidivism rate compared to a sixty percent recidivism rate for untreated
offenders. 230 The implication is clear: rehabilitation still is possible after
an initial denial of responsibility for the offense, 231  but without
[i]ndividuals are viewed as nested within interconnected systems (i.e., individual,
family, extrafamilial) that influence behavior in a reciprocal fashion. Sexual
offending and other problem behaviors, therefore, are viewed as maintained by
transactions within and/or between any one or combination of these systems.
Because characteristics of individual sexual offenders and factors contributing to
and maintaining offending behavior vary, treatment is individualized and addresses
difficulties in all involved systems.
Cynthia Cupit Swenson et al., Changing the Social Ecologies of Adolescent Sexual Offenders:
Implications of the Success of Multisystemic Therapy in Treating Serious Antisocial Behavior in
Adolescents, 3 CHILD MALTREATMENT 330, 333 (1998). This Casenote does not propound MST
as an effective alternative to cognitive-behavioral treatment modalities for adult offenders; it
merely uses it as an illustration of the idea that treatment effectiveness does not have to be
inversely proportional to constitutionality.
230. Id. at 373. Different sources give different recidivism rates, and the truth is that nobody
knows. The United States Supreme Court seems to be relying on a fifteen percent recidivism rate
for treated offenders compared with an eighty percent recidivism rate for untreated offenders. See
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33 (2002) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO TREATING THE INCARCERATED MALE SEX OFFENDER, at xiii (1988)).
More recent research indicates that these legal scholars may have overestimated treatment related
reductions in sexual offense recidivism rates by overestimating the recidivism rates for untreated
offenders. A recent meta-analysis of treatment studies reported an average recidivism rate, based
on an average forty-six month follow-up period, of around twelve percent for treated offenders
compared to an untreated comparison group's recidivism rate of around seventeen percent. R.
Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data Project on the Effectiveness of
Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. OF RES. & TREATMENT 169
(2002). The discrepancy is illustrative of the difficulties in comparing such numbers. Both
treated and untreated sex offenders can recidivate without being detected before the end of the
follow-up period or recidivate, whether or not detected, after the end of the follow up period,
potentially causing recidivism rates for both groups to be artificially low.
231. "Denial" and "take responsibility" can have different meanings in the legal and in the
therapeutic context. In a legal context, they refer to a defendant who claims that he is a victim of
a fabrication or mistaken identity and, while acknowledging that the actions, had he done them,
would have constituted a crime, denies that he committed them. In a therapy context, the terms
refer to a patient who admits to acts that constitute a crime but denies that there should be any
moral or legal consequences to those acts. For example, an accused sex offender who claimed
that he was at home reading the Bible with his mother when the crime took place would be
denying the offense and refusing to take responsibility for it in the legal sense. An accused sex
offender who admits to fondling neighborhood children but insists (and probably believes) that he
is not a child molester but, instead, the neighborhood volunteer sexual education instructor would
be denying the offense and refusing to take responsibility for his actions in the therapeutic sense.
Speaking strictly out of common sense, the sex offender who exhibits denial in the
therapeutic sense espouses a high risk of recidivism simply because he does not believe that there
are any valid reasons to abstain from his offensive behavior. This can be illustrated by empirical
data. See Mark J. Macgowan & Jill Levenson, Psychometrics of the Group Engagemenet
Measure with Male Sex Offenders, 34 SMALL GROUP RES. (forthcoming 2003). The suggestion
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intending to do so, states opt to revoke probation when this happens,
resulting in a higher recidivism rate.232
Exactly how wise is it to assume that the traditional cycle of con-
fession, repentance, and redemption is the only way to decrease the like-
lihood of committing future offenses? Many of us refrain from criminal
activity simply out of empathy for potential victims or for fear of getting
caught. For example, when I only need to be in a store for a few min-
utes, the next closest parking spot is a hundred yards away, and it is
raining, I confess that sometimes an unoccupied handicapped parking
space ten feet from the entrance looks attractive to me. Nevertheless,
even though there have been times when I would have liked to do so, I
refrain from parking there because: (1) I have empathy for a handi-
capped driver who might come along while I am in the store and be
forced to park a hundred yards away; (2) I understand that if everyone
did this, it would erode the benefits that handicapped drivers receive
from the designated spaces; and (3) I know that the City of Miami
employs some of the world's greatest parking violation detectives, and I
would get caught.
If I were to slip into a lapse of social irresponsibility and park in
such a space, and a traffic court ordered me into parking rehabilitation,
my therapist might do better to re-indoctrinate me with the preventive
considerations that once controlled my desire than to extract a confes-
sion and purge me of my desire to do so. Attempting to eliminate my
desire would be futile because when it is raining and the next closest
parking space is a hundred yards away, everyone thinks about it. This is
a desire we all understand, and sex offenders deal with much stronger
desires.
An often quoted yet seldom cited survey found that just less than
one half of male freshman at UCLA, surveyed over ten years, reported
that they would commit rape if they were certain that they could get
away with it.2 33 Perhaps it is overly simplistic, 2 34 then, to reason that
here is that offenders who exhibit denial in the legal sense are still amenable to treatment through
means that do not require such admissions, and such treatment modalities would not offend the
Constitution if they are imposed by the state.
232. Accord Tanabe, supra note 6, at 853.
233. Neil M. Malamuth, Predictors of Naturalistic Sexual Aggression, 50 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 953 (1986).
234. Compare Bruce J. Winick, Sexually Violent Predator Laws and Registration and
Community Notification Laws: Policy Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505, 521 (1998)
("There is ... a considerable difference between a desire not resisted and an irresistible desire."),
with Kim English, The Science of Sex Offenders: Risk Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 218 (1998) ("The sex offender's deviant fantasies are tantamount to
planning sessions for the refinement of future behaviors."). Nevertheless, the distinction must be
recognized between a person unable to control a desire he knows to be improper and a person who
fails to perceive reality. As Justice Scalia recently explained, "[tihe man who has a will of steel,
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treatment programs might be more effective if they focused on cultivat-
ing victim empathy and emphasizing the inevitability of getting
caught235 rather than focusing on confession and redemption. On the
other hand, perhaps this is an obvious conclusion. A higher recidivism
rate means a greater number of sex crime victims, and if Kaden is cor-
rect in his assertion that foregoing the prospect of alternative treatment
programs results in higher recidivism, the Florida Legislature surely did
not intend that result. When a trial court faced with the decision
between revoking probation for failure to admit guilt and allowing a
probationer to continue probation in an alternative treatment program,
the legislature's true intent cannot be other than that the trial court
should choose the option that will result in a lower number of future sex
crime victims.
For this reason, a trial court faced with this dilemma would fulfill
the legislature's intent better if it chose the latter option. They can, for
reasons explained in Part IV.C, infra, and should do so; the Legislature
should take a second look at the manner in which section
948.03(5)(b)(1) is applied in practice and decide whether it truly fulfills
legislative intent; and treatment providers should consider the treatment
methods outlined by Kaden, which both preserve probationers' constitu-
tional rights and reduce recidivism to a greater extent.
but who delusionally believes that every woman he meets is inviting crude sexual advances, is
surely a dangerous sexual predator . Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 422 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
For instance, a convicted sex offender once disclosed during a polygraph examination that he
had been assisting young boys with the use of the restroom in his condominium lobby as a
subterfuge for fondling their genitals. After admitting this, the probationer refused to believe that
he had done anything wrong, insisting he did not act out of desire for sexual gratification but,
instead, acted out of desire to be of assistance to young boys who needed help using the restroom.
Interview with George Slattery, Slattery Corp., in Miami, Fla. (Jan. 10, 2002) (relating the
anecdote). The implication is that this probationer did not empathize with his victims because he
believed that he did his victims no harm, and he did not fear getting caught because he believed
that he did nothing wrong. Dealing with this probationer is no easy task for the state. Obviously,
the polygraph requirement did not deter him because he re-offended even with the imposition of
the requirement, and confrontation therapy would be ineffective because, despite what he might
tell his treatment provider to comply with his probation conditions, he never will believe that he
did anything wrong. It seems, then, that the state's only option would be to incarcerate him for the
protection of the community. Nevertheless, he might have been a prime candidate for
multisystemic therapy, whereby even though he believes that he is not doing anything wrong, he
might learn to refrain from the behavior through the realization that the community around him
disapproves of it and will reject him. The other options are to allow him to serve his sentence, and
when the sentence is over, unleash him on the community untreated or incarcerate him
indefinitely; neither of which is an appealing option.
235. Indeed, impressing the probationer with the inevitability of getting caught is one of the
goals of the monitoring/maintenance polygraph examination. Nevertheless, this rationale is
inapplicable to the instant offense polygraph examination because the probationer already has
been caught.
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C. Separation of Powers236 and the Propriety of a Trial Judge
Directing Treatment
In State ex rel. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v.
Sepe,2 37 the Third District granted a writ of prohibition against part of a
trial court's involuntary commitment order that prescribed medications
to be given to the patient and the time period for treatment.238 In so
doing, the Third District held that the trial court had usurped the depart-
ment's jurisdiction as authorized by law,239 essentially holding that once
the defendant was committed to the department's care for treatment, the
department, not the court, had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the
method of his treatment. In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Ser-
vices v. Stoutamire,24 ° the Second District declined to apply Sepe to a
situation in which the legislature statutorily mandates a duty to a particu-
lar patient,24' to wit, the right to receive treatment suited to his needs . 42
Hence, Stoutamire confined the Sepe holding to situations in which the
court seeks to interfere with the general operations of a department24
3
and not to situations in which the trial court seeks to protect a patient's
statutorily-created right.
While it would seem that, reasoning by analogy, Stoutamire makes
Sepe inapplicable to a situation where a trial court directs polygraph
examinations as a form of treatment because the directive is in further-
ance of a statutory mandate, this does not dispose of the matter com-
pletely. First of all, Stoutamire held that Sepe was superseded by
statute2 4 as applied to Stoutamire's facts, which are distinguishable
from those created by section 948.03(5)(b)(1); second, even if Stouta-
mire were interpreted to mean that Sepe was inapplicable to a situation
where a trial court acts under statutory mandate, confusion exists as to
whether section 948.03(5)(b)(1) qualifies as a statutory mandate.
In Stoutamire, the trial court enjoined the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services from placing a patient at the South Florida Eval-
uation and Treatment Center due to problems with that facility, and the
Second District held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
doing so to protect the patient's statutory right to receive treatment
236. See FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
237. 291 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
238. Id. at 109.
239. FLA. STAT. § 394.459 (2001). To see it in its 1974 incarnation, see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.459 (West 2002).
240. 602 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
241. Id. at 567.
242. FLA. STAT. § 916.107(4) (2001).
243. See Stoutamire, 602 So. 2d at 567.'
244. FLA. STAr. § 916.107 (2001) (defining the rights of patients committed as incompetent to
stand trial or acquitted by reason of insanity).
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suited to her needs.245 Hence, Stoutamire held that the trial court acted
within its authority by enjoining an action that would interfere with the
patient's statutory right, but section 948.03(5)(b)(1) hardly confers a
right to receive polygraph examinations against the probationer's will.
Nevertheless, if a treatment provider were to conclude that a particular
sex offender would benefit from one of several alternate therapies 246 in
lieu of a therapy that incorporates polygraph examinations, Sepe raises
serious questions about whether the court may mandate the treatment
recommended in the NIJ Report over the treatment provider's better
judgment.
The answer depends on whether the preferred treatment for sex
offenders on probation is a substantive matter, which falls within the
legislature's power, or a procedural matter, which falls within the inher-
ent power of the courts.247 Conditions of probation fall within the twi-
light area. The statute falls within Title XLVII, Criminal Procedure and
Corrections, and applying Justice Ginsburg's reasoning,"' this makes
more persuasive the argument that the requirement is procedural. If so,
the statutory mandate would be an invasion of the courts' inherent pow-
ers. 249 Therefore, following the policy of construing a statute in favor of
its constitutionality, 5 ° the courts should interpret the words "shall" and
"must" as meaning "may." '251 Giving consideration to the foregoing, if a
treatment provider determines that a particular sex offender would
respond better to treatment that does not require polygraph examina-
tions, the separation of powers doctrine gives a trial judge the discretion
to forgo ordering the examinations. Indeed, the doctrine might even for-
bid her from ordering the examinations, and a trial judge may be com-
pelled under Stoutamire to enjoin the treatment provider from requiring
polygraph examinations should she determine that doing so is necessary
to protect a probationer's constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The Fifth District recently did something similar to this. In Lane v.
State, 2 a probationer sentenced prior to the enactment of section
245. See Stoutamire, 602 So. 2d at 567-68.
246. See infra Part VI.B.
247. See Roger A. Silver, The Inherent Power of the Florida Courts, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257,
282 (1985).
248. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 57 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (asserting that
a rule forbidding evidence of voluntary intoxication as a factor negating mens rea was an
evidentiary, and therefore procedural, rule rather than a substantive law because it fell within the
Montana evidence code rather than among its criminal laws).
249. See Rich v. Ryals, 212 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1968).
250. Id. at 643.
251. See Ryals, 212 So. 2d at 643; Simmons v. State, 36 So. 2d 208, 209 (Fla. 1948) (quoting
Becker v. Lebanon & M. Ry. Co., 41 A. 612 (Pa. 1898)). See also 48A FLA. JUR. 2d Statutes § 19
(2002).
252. 762 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
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948.03(5)(b)(1) appealed from revocation of probation for failure to sub-
mit to physician-imposed polygraph examinations. 3 The district court
reversed and ordered the trial court to reinstate the original probation
conditions, purportedly because the original trial court order did not
require polygraph examinations, only that he undergo counseling.254
Hence, although the trial court may order polygraph examinations either
sua sponte, as in Cassamassima, or pursuant to the statute, it may not
delegate the discretion whether or not to impose them to the treating
physician by conditioning probation on treatment. This creates a separa-
tion of powers conundrum in that Lane stands for the proposition that
only the trial court may order polygraph examinations as a part of ther-
apy, and Sepe stands for the proposition that only the treatment provider
may determine the method of treatment. Nevertheless, the cases may be
read consistently with one another when one considers that the Lane
court seemed to believe that it was passing on monitoring/maintenance
examinations similar to those in Cassamassima as evidenced by its
statement: "[T]esting of those on probation to determine compliance
with conditions imposed by the court are an important part of programs
designed to rehabilitate offenders." '255
While this observation resolves the conflict, it is unnerving to real-
ize that the Lane court did not seem to notice that the polygraph exami-
nations required by the statute are different from the polygraph
examinations ordered by the Cassamassima trial court. The Cassamas-
sima examinations had more to do with monitoring Cassamassima's
compliance with probation conditions and less to do with therapy, but
the Lane court assumed that the examinations Lane's physician sought
to impose "to obtain information necessary for risk management and
treatment and to reduce the sex offender's denial mechanisms, 2 56 were
identical to the examinations the Cassamassima trial court ordered as an
"effective deterrent to reoffend .... ,,21' The Lane court's failure to
distinguish between the types of polygraph examinations, perhaps
because the differences were not brought to its attention, reflects its
belief that, in a separation of powers analysis, the power to order the
monitoring/maintenance examination belongs to the courts. Had the
Lane court understood that some polygraph examinations fulfill a super-
visory purpose and others a treatment purpose, it may have been more
comfortable with a treating physician, rather than the trial court, impos-
ing the examinations under a separation of powers analysis. As it
253. Id. at 560.
254. Id. at 560-61.
255. Id. at 561.
256. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(I) (2001).
257. Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 909 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
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stands, it is unclear whether a probationer is required to undergo sexual
history examinations and instant offense examinations as a result of the
polygraph condition or as a result of a treatment condition.
D. The Right to Privacy and the Sexual History Examination
While it is unlikely that a probation condition ever could be struck
down as violating a probationer's right to privacy,258 discussion of the
constitutional implications of the polygraph requirement would be
incomplete without it. In holding that Georgia had no authority to
restrict a defendant's consumption of pornography in the privacy of his
own home, the United States Supreme Court wrote in Stanley v. Geor-
gia259 : "IT]his argument amounts to nothing more than the assertion that
the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's
thoughts. To some, this may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly incon-
sistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment.""26 While federal
courts tend to agree that a federal right of privacy exists despite the lack
of a textual basis for it in the Constitution,26" ' Florida's constitution
expressly grants the right.262
Although a probationer's complaint that compulsion to reveal his
sexual fantasies and sexual thoughts to his therapist is exactly the type of
intrusion into private thoughts that Stanley sought to prevent would not
be without force, the argument would fail. As the Cassamassima court
noted, probation conditions by their very nature restrict probationers'
rights. 263 The relevant inquiry is whether the condition: "(1) has no rela-
tionship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to
conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids con-
duct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. 264 It cannot
be said that compulsion to reveal thoughts and fantasies, though not
criminal actions, to a treatment provider is unrelated either to the instant
offense or to future criminality. Additionally, the argument that a poly-
graph machine invades probationers' privacy by disclosing information
in which a probationer has a reasonable expectation of privacy, i.e., his
258. Indeed, surrender of privacy is the very nature of probation. Arguing that a probation
condition should be revoked because it interferes with a probationer's right to privacy is akin to
arguing that an inmate should be released because incarceration would interfere with his right to
liberty.
259. Stanley v. Georgia, 384 U.S. 557 (1969).
260. Id. at 565-66.
261. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
262. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
263. See Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 909-10 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
264. Wiggins v. State, 386 So. 2d 46, 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 378
So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)).
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heart rate, blood pressure, breathing rate, and galvanic activity, is both
charming and novel, but it probably fails the laugh test.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Cassamassima's Effect on the Interpretation of
Section 948.03(5)(b)(1)
1. CASSAMASSIMA, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT CASES, AND THE
MONITORING/MAINTENANCE EXAMINATION
As explained in Part IV, supra, the Cassamassima trial court's
belief that a monitoring/maintenance examination indicating deception
would form the basis of a probation violation was mistaken. It can-
not. 6 5 Nevertheless, a deceptive answer would serve to alert the proba-
tion officer that the probationer needs to be supervised more closely.
2 66
These examinations are helpful to the probation system as they provide a
tool for supervising officers, who have large caseloads, to determine
which probationers are in need of closer supervision. They have no
implications for probationers' Fifth Amendment rights and provide a
convincing deterrent to re-offending.267 In this respect, Cassamassima
was correct in approving monitoring/maintenance polygraph examina-
tions, and Florida courts faced with passing on the constitutionality of
this procedure should not hesitate to follow Cassamassima. Neverthe-
less, probation officers should hesitate to rely on polygraph examina-
tions exclusively but, instead, should consider polygraph as one of
several factors in determining which probationers deserve the most
attention.268 If empirical evidence later shows that palm readers can
deter new offenses and provide a semi-accurate indication of recidivism
risks, probation officers should treat them the same way.
2. CASSAMASSIMA AND THE FREQUENCY OF THE EXAMINATIONS
The Legislature intended that polygraph examinations be used "to
obtain information necessary for risk management and treatment and to
reduce the sex offender's denial mechanisms," 269 not to manipulate pro-
bationers financially. Trial courts must protect against this with vigi-
lance and should, in equity, refuse to revoke probation should they
265. See Cassarnassima, 657 So. 2d at 911.
266. See NIJ Report, supra note 59, at 6.
267. See Skousen, supra note 38, at 12 (epitomizing the effectiveness of the polygraph in
curing homosexuals by quoting the statement, "Everytime [sic] I get the inclination, I think of that
damned box and right away it turns me off").
268. See Becker & Murphy, supra note 224 (explaining that the polygraph method's
shortcomings diminish the amount of faith a supervising officer should put in them).
269. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b)(I) (2001).
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determine that the state abused the statute by using the requirement in
this manner.
B. Beyond Cassamassima: Section 948.03(5)(b)(1) and the
New Polygraph Frontier
1. MURPHY AND THE SEXUAL HISTORY EXAMINATIONS
Cassamassima did not address these examinations, and courts faced
with the responsibility of passing on their constitutionality need to
address them under current caselaw rather than follow Cassamassima.
There are two possible purposes that these examinations might serve: (1)
to aid the therapist in treatment and risk management by assessing the
probationer's behavior patterns; and (2) to gather evidence to be used
against the probationer in subsequent prosecution under the pretext of
aiding the therapist. The first is both constitutionally permissible and
consistent with the statutory language, and the second is neither. For
this reason, the privilege against self-incrimination provides the mecha-
nism whereby the state may extract the relevant testimony for the first
purpose and not for the second.
2. THE INSTANT OFFENSE EXAMINATION
Of all of the examinations applied under section 948.03, this one is
the most troublesome, and the substantial differences between the Flor-
ida situation and the Imlay situation necessitate fresh analysis by the
Florida courts under article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution,
Thomas, Henderson, and Imlay. Should the courts conclude that this
examination passes constitutional muster and is necessary for successful
treatment, courts should nevertheless protect Fifth Amendment rights by
allowing probationers who pleaded not guilty and/or testified on their
own behalves to forego the examinations until exhaustion of post-con-
viction remedies and, if necessary, should hold perjury prosecutions
stemming from such confessions to be nonjusticiable. Both the courts
and the legislature need to give serious consideration to the results of
empirical studies condensed by Kaden, namely, that legislatively
imposed confrontation therapy not only raises serious self-incrimination
issues but results in a higher rate of recidivism than would result if other
forms of therapy were allowed.
C. Closing Comments and a Note About Politics
While the foregoing discussion is of interest to academics, practi-
tioners, and civil libertarians, it must be understood that, to most Ameri-
cans, sex offenders receive a level of collective hatred surpassed,
perhaps, only by terrorists. For this reason, political pressure on the leg-
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islature to amend state law so as to protect sex offenders' rights is likely
to remain nil. Nevertheless, it is axiomatic that protecting constitutional
rights often involves protecting undesirable people who do undesirable
things. We enjoy our freedom to be secure in our homes, papers, and
possessions, but our resolve is weakened when "[t]he criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered. 2 70 We enjoy our freedom of
speech, but our resolve is weakened when the Nazis want to march
down our streets. 27 Likewise, we enjoy our freedom from compelled
self-incrimination, but our resolve is weakened when the time comes to
allow a convicted sex offender the same right. Indeed, this sentiment
sometimes leads to regarding the fundamental rights upon which our
country was founded as "technicalities," whereby, "The conviction was
overturned because the court admitted evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment," becomes, in the colloquial: "He got off on a
technicality. 272
Nevertheless, scholars, lawyers, judges, and politicians all know
that allowing even an unpopular group to lose one of these rights trans-
forms these rights from "inalienable" to "negotiable" for the rest of us.
As is evident from the history of judicially imposed polygraph examina-
tions, they first were ordered for all convicted defendants.273 When the
appellate courts sympathized with the constitutional and evidentiary
arguments against them, they were restricted to use with sex offenders, a
group much less sympathetic than those who take abandoned furni-
ture.2 74 If the state persists in this activity for the next twenty years, then
when the practice is expanded to its original degree, it may be too late to
make an objection to it. This is why constitutional rights must be
defended even when it hurts to do so.
But in this instance, it would not hurt at all to change a law that
both fails to achieve what it set out to accomplish and infringes on fun-
damental rights. Cassamassima represented both good law and good
public policy. Utilizing the polygraph as one of many factors in a proba-
tion officer's determination of which probationers warrant more atten-
tion is desirable for the administration of Florida's probation system and
does not offend any constitutional right. Nevertheless, the legislature's
270. People v. DeFore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.).
271. See Viii. of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978).
272. The author cannot take credit for this observation in good conscience as it belongs to
Professor Lawrence Rose of the University of Miami School of Law.
273. See supra Part II.A.I.
274. People v. McVet, 287 N.E.2d 479, 484 (I11. App. 1972). Perhaps Fred McCaw, president
of the Iowa District Attorney Association, explained it best when he said, "The attitude [among
lawmakers] is, castrate them, poke their eyes out, whatever you do, it's OK, because they're sex
offenders." Stephanie Simon, He's a Sexual Predator, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 5, 2003, at IL.
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extension of polygraph usage to authorize the sexual history and instant
offense examinations poses troublesome constitutional problems. Addi-
tionally, inasmuch as the statute threatens to revoke probation upon fail-
ure to submit to them, the legislature has opted for a course of action
that leaves sex offenders untreated rather than allow alternative treat-
ment options. This is both bad law and bad policy, and if the legislature
does not revise the statute to bring it in line with the state and federal
constitutions, then the courts should act to protect the rights of Florida's
convicted defendants and the safety of Florida's communities.
On much more macroscopic level, courts and legislatures need to
understand the precedents they are creating. Polygraph represents a
crude and primitive attempt to provide an interface between a person's
memories and the external forces that wish to access them without inter-
ference from the individual's will to provide (or withhold) them. We
cannot yet access these thoughts and memories except by attempting to
deduce them from the physiological responses we suppose that they
cause, but the day is not far off when computers can effectively interface
with our brains and access the catalogue of information and memories
contained therein. When we can do this, the courts will have to answer
questions about the extent to which the state can compel individuals to
allow the use of this technology for criminal justice purposes, and they
will no longer be permitted to base their analyses on imperfections in the
interface itself as either justifying or prohibiting its use. When faced
with these questions, the courts will have only the polygraph cases on
which to rely as precedent. What exactly do we want those precedents
to say?
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